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In South Dakota, a defendant convicted of assault in state court
receives an average sentence of twenty-nine months.1 However, if a
Native American defendant were to commit that same offense within
one of the Indian reservations in South Dakota, the defendant would be
prosecuted in federal court and receive an average sentence of forty-
seven months.' This glaring disparity, whereby Native Americans
prosecuted for aggravated assault in Indian country receive sentences
sixty-two percent higher than defendants convicted in state court for the
same offense, is a product of the complex jurisdictional arrangement
surrounding Indian country and the rigidity of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Joel M. Flaum, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals; J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law, 2007. The author wishes to thank Professor Max
Schanzenbach for his insight, guidance, and assistance in shepherding this Article from its
rough concept to its final form. The views in this Article are the author's own, as of course
are all errors.
1. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc ADVISORY GROUP ON
NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING ISSUES 32 (2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/naag/nativeamer.pdf [hereinafter NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY
GROUP]. This Report also notes that, according to Richard Braunstein and Steve Feimer, the
average state court sentence for a Native American convicted of assault is twenty-two
months, compared to thirty-four months for white defendants. Id. at 32 n.60; see also Richard
Braunstein & Steve Feimer, South Dakota Criminal Justice: A Study of Racial Disparities, 48
S.D. L. REV. 171,194 (2003).
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR
2005, DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA 12 tbl.7, 25 tbl.7 (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2005/sd05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET] (reporting forty-nine-month mean sentence in South
Dakota for assault during fiscal year 2005 pre-Booker and a forty-five-month mean sentence
in South Dakota for assault during fiscal year 2005 post-Booker). This was higher than the
national mean for assault during fiscal year 2005, which was thirty-seven months pre-Booker
and forty-four months post-Booker. Id. In 2002, the average federal sentence for assault in
South Dakota was 53.3 months, while the national mean was 38.7 months. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2002, DISTRICT OF SOUTH
DAKOTA 10 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2002/sd02.pdf [hereinafter
2002 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET].
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Due to Native American tribes' unique status as "domestic
dependent nations" within the United States, the federal government
holds criminal jurisdiction over most crimes committed within Indian
country. As a result, Native Americans are subject to federal
jurisdiction for many offenses that are almost exclusively within states'
criminal jurisdiction, such as manslaughter, assault, and sex offenses.
For example, in Minnesota, South Dakota, and New Mexico-three
states with large Native American populations-Native Americans
accounted for only six percent of sexual abuse offenders in state courts
but over ninety percent of sexual abuse offenders in federal court
As illustrated by sentences for aggravated assault in South Dakota,
federal sentences are often harsher than their state counterparts.4 As a
result, for many crimes committed by Native Americans within Indian
country,5 these defendants suffer disproportionately harsher sentences
than if they were non-Indian6 or had committed their crimes off the
reservation. Prior to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal judges
could minimize this disparity by reducing federal sentences to a level in
line with corresponding state punishments. However, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines severely restrained judicial discretion, impairing
judges' ability to respond to this disparity.
Despite the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' goal of promoting
3. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 21 n.37. Note that in
Minnesota, the federal government maintains criminal jurisdiction over only one of the
eleven tribes in the state-the Red Lake Reservation. The other tribes are all under Public
Law 280 jurisdiction, meaning the State of Minnesota has full criminal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (2000).
4. See Christine DeMaso, Note, Advisory Sentencing and the Federalization of Crime:
Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity Between State and Federal Sentences
Under Booker? 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2108 (2006) (citing Michael A. Simons,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling
Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 917-18 (2000); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet
Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 979, 998-99 (1995)). Sex offenses are another example of this disparity. In
New Mexico, for example, the average sentence for a sex offense was twenty-five months,
compared to eighty-six months in federal court. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP,
supra note 1, at 21-22. Note that "[i]f only the more severe class 1 and 2 felony offenses in
New Mexico are considered, the state mean sentence is 43 months." Id. at 22.
5. This is particularly true for manslaughter, assault, and sexual abuse. See NATIVE
AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 13-34; see also Jon M. Sands, Indian Crimes
and Federal Courts, 11 FED. SENT'G REP. 153, 153 (1998) (noting that in 1997, close to
seventy-five percent of all manslaughter and sexual abuse cases in federal court were Indian
offenses).
6. Crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians within Indian country are
prosecuted in state courts according to state substantive law. See infra Part II.A.5.
[91:723
NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING DISPARITY
uniformity and minimizing disparity,7 the Guidelines have had the
opposite effect with respect to Native Americans. As Judge Charles B.
Kornmann, a United States District Court Judge in South Dakota, has
said:
Ask virtually any United States District Judge presiding
over cases from Indian Country whether the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are fair to Native Americans; ask
virtually any appellate judge dealing with cases from
Indian Country the same question, and I believe the
answer would largely be the same: No. Too often are we
required to impose sentences based on injustice rather
than justice, and this bothers us greatly.8
This Article, therefore, proposes a method by which federal judges can
deviate downward from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines so that
Native American defendants' sentences better align with corresponding
state sentences. While this Article does not mark the first time the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' impact on Native Americans has been
criticized, prior attempts to resolve this issue have been largely
unsuccessful. 9 The Supreme Court's 2005 decision in United States v.
Booker, however, changed the federal sentencing landscape by ruling
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than
mandatory.' ° This Article will show how district court judges can
exercise this new-found post-Booker discretion to correct for Native
American sentencing disparities.
Although correcting for Native American sentencing disparities
post-Booker has not been a lively area of discussion among judges or
legal academics, whether district courts have discretion to award non-
Guidelines sentences to account for disparity caused by fast-track
programs or Congress's crack-powder cocaine sentencing ratio have
garnered a great deal of attention." Courts' treatment of the disparity in
these other contexts, therefore, serves as a useful proxy as to the
7. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL]; infra
Part III.A.1.
8. Charles B. Kornmann, Injustices: Applying the Sentencing Guidelines and Other
Federal Mandates in Indian Country, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 71, 71 (2000).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
11. See infra Part V.
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likelihood of district courts being able to account for Native American
sentencing disparity under the post-Booker sentencing regime.
In many respects, the issue of fast-track disparity is the stronger
comparator to Native American sentencing disparity. The disparity in
such cases stems from the fact that in the 2003 PROTECT Act,
Congress granted the Attorney General the power to authorize fast-
track programs, whereby illegal aliens prosecuted in districts with a
large docket of immigration cases are given a lower sentence than
otherwise would be given under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines if
they enter into a "rapid guilty plea., 12 Therefore, the disparity in both
the fast-track and Native American contexts is geographically based,
and in both circumstances Congress established the framework creating
the disparity. Most circuit court decisions, however, with the exception
of the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ossa-Gallegos,3 had
rejected arguments for non-Guidelines sentences being awarded to
correct such disparity." This Article, as originally drafted, had advanced
a conservative approach to correcting Native American sentencing
disparity based on this Sixth Circuit opinion, whereby district courts
were advised to reduce, but not fully eliminate the disparity between
federal and state sentences.
In December 2007, however, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Kimbrough," in which the Court held that under Booker,
district court judges were not bound to accept the 100:1 crack-powder
sentencing ratio that existed in the Guidelines. 16 The Court determined
that while courts were bound by the minimum and maximum sentences
proscribed by Congress, "it would not be an abuse of discretion for a
district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that
the crack-powder disparity yields a sentence 'greater than necessary' to
achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes."' 7  This holding significantly enhances
district court judges' ability to award non-Guidelines sentences in the
Native American and fast-track contexts.'8
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. 453 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, a defendant appealed his sentence to the
Sixth Circuit, arguing that while the district court judge provided a two-step downward
departure, in part to account for fast-track disparity, a four-step reduction was necessary to
fully mitigate the disparity. See infra Part V.A.2.b.
14. See infra Part V.A.2.
15. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
16. See infra Part V.B.2.
17. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
18. See Second Circuit Sentencing Blog, Non-Guidelines Sentences Based on Fast-Track
Disparity Still Possible in the Second Circuit?, http://federalsentencing.typepad.com/
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This Article, therefore, will address district court judges' authority to
correct for Native American sentencing disparity in light of Kimbrough,
as well as what lessons can still be drawn from the debate surrounding
fast-track disparity. Applying the same principles articulated by the
Court in Kimbrough, it is evident that Congress has not barred
sentencing courts from considering sentencing disparity as it relates to
Native Americans. Moreover, the findings of the Native American
Advisory Group reflect that the Guidelines fail to properly consider the
impact federal sentences have on Native Americans. After establishing
that district courts have the authority to consider Native American
sentencing disparity when sentencing Native American defendants, this
Article will then show how judges are to consider this issue in light of
judges' instruction to sentence defendants in accord with the factors set
forth in § 3553(a).
Admittedly, the approach advocated in this Article will not fully
eradicate Native American sentencing disparity. If a district court
chooses not to alter a sentence based on such disparity, circuit courts are
permitted to treat a district court's decision to adhere to the Guidelines
as presumptively reasonable,' 9 and moreover, even non-Guidelines
sentences will still be bound by the statutory minimums and maximums
set by Congress. 20 Any attempt to fully eradicate the disparate sentences
endured by Native American defendants, however, would require wide-
sweeping reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or major
congressional changes to the Major Crimes Act.2' This proposal offers
two advantages to such an alternative. First, the proposal presented in
this Article presents an immediate solution to Native American
defendants. Any attempt to fundamentally modify the Guidelines or
amend the Major Crimes Act would require a high degree of political
capital to obtain, and so far, such attempts have fallen short.22
Furthermore, with Native American sentencing disparity being a
developments injfederal s/sentencing-disparity/index.html (Jan. 3, 2008) (discussing, in light
of Kimbrough, the Second Circuit's acknowledgment in United States v. Liriano-Blanco, 510
F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2007), that the reasonableness of non-Guidelines sentences to correct
for fast-track disparity was not a settled question).
19. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
20. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574 ("[P]ossible variations among district courts are
constrained by the mandatory minimum Congress prescribed.").
21. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Rita virtually assures that it is not per se
unreasonable for a district court to sentence a Native American to a within-Guidelines
sentence because the Court held that circuit courts can presume that within-Guidelines
sentences are reasonable. 127 S. Ct. at 2462.
22. See infra Part III.B.2.a.i.
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byproduct of a jurisdictional issue, the courts, particularly post-Booker,
are perhaps the branch best suited to resolve this concern.
This Article will proceed in seven parts. Following this introduction,
Part II will discuss how criminal jurisdiction in Indian country works as
well as the unique circumstances surrounding Indian crime. Next, Part
III will provide an overview of the history of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines pre-Booker and discuss previous recommendations for
eliminating sentencing disparity for Native Americans under the pre-
Booker regime. Part IV will then look at Booker and the post-Booker
landscape, with Part V analyzing the issue of fast-track and crack-
powder disparity in the courts. Finally, Part VI will study how courts
post-Booker can correct for Native American sentencing disparities,
with Part VII offering the conclusion.
II. CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Indian crime is a unique subset of criminal law in the United States.
Tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations, 23 has led to a
complicated criminal jurisdictional arrangement over Indian country.
This Part will begin by discussing the interplay between federal, state,
and tribal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Next, this Part will
briefly discuss the impact Indian culture and reservation life have on
Indian crime. Finally, this Part will examine aggravated assault
prosecutions in South Dakota to illustrate the jurisdictional complexities
and resulting sentencing disparity surrounding crime in Indian country.
A. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
The United States' recognition of tribal sovereignty and the
exclusive role of the federal government in dealing with Indian affairs
has its roots in the United States Constitution.4 In the early years of the
country's history, the Supreme Court decided three cases, referred to as
"The Marshall Trilogy," that set forth the bedrock principles of Indian
law that persist to this day.25 These cases established Indian tribes'
23. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
24. In the Constitution, Congress is given the power to "regulate Commerce... with the
Indian tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the President's treaty power extends to Indian
affairs, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
25. Jennifer Butts, Note, Victims in Waiting: How the Homeland Security Act Falls Short
of Fully Protecting Tribal Lands, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2003-2004). The three
cases that comprise "The Marshall Trilogy" are Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823), Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832).
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unique status as "domestic dependent nations, 2 6 whereby the United
States serves as a "guardian" over Indian country, 2 but state laws "can
have no force." 28 Based upon these core principles, tribes have inherent
sovereignty over criminal matters, free from state interference, but
subject to federal law.29 The federal government has passed a series of
laws that define the contours of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country,
with "Indian country" including: (1) "all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government," (2) "all dependent Indian communities within the . . .
United States," and (3) "all Indian allotments [where] the Indian title[]"
to the allotment still exists.3° The details of these laws are discussed
below.
1. The General Crimes Act
a. History and Scope of the General Crimes Act
Soon after the Revolutionary War, Congress passed a series of laws
providing federal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes
against Indians in Indian country, in order to provide a buffer between
Indian and non-Indian populations'.3  These laws were expanded and
took their current form in 1817, when Congress passed the General
26. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (stating that Indian tribes should not be
considered "foreign" states, but "[t]hey may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases."). The foundation for this definition of Indian status was established in Johnson v.
M'Intosh, where Marshall recognized that Indians' legal right in their lands was good against
all third parties, except the United States. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 14-15 (4th ed. 2004).
27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("Meanwhile [tribes] are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.").
28. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
29. The Supreme Court has, on a series of occasions, affirmed Congress's legislative
power over crime in Indian country. In United States v. Rogers, the Court held that "Congress
may by law punish any offence [in Indian territory], no matter whether the offender be a
white man or an Indian." 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). Similarly, in United States v.
Kagama, the Court upheld Congress's authority to pass the Major Crimes Act based upon the
federal government's duty to protect the Indian tribes. 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). More
recently, in United States v. Antelope, the Court said, "Congress has undoubted constitutional
power to prescribe a criminal code applicable in Indian Country." 430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977);
see also NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 5.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
31. CANBY, supra note 26, at 133 (citing 1 Stat. 138 (1790); 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 2 Stat. 139
(1802)).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Crimes Act 2 This law extended general federal criminal law applicable
in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction to Indian country.33 Explicitly
excluded by the General Crimes Act were: (1) crimes committed by one
Indian against another Indian, (2) crimes committed by an Indian that
had already been punished by the tribe, and (3) cases where federal
jurisdiction is excluded by treaty."
The practical effect of the General Crimes Act is that it applies to all
offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
Subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court held that the General
Crimes Act does not apply to crimes committed by non-Indians against
non-Indians in Indian country, and instead such defendants are subject
to state jurisdiction.35 This decision, however, is not constitutionally
based, and therefore, it is within Congress's authority to amend the
General Crimes Act to apply to crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians within Indian country. 6 With respect to the Act's
applicability to Indians, as implied by the second exception to the
General Crimes Act, the Act does apply to crimes committed by Indians
against non-Indians in Indian country. 37 However, if, as discussed in the
next section, the crime committed by the Indian against the non-Indian
is a "major crime," then the prosecution must be brought pursuant to
the Major Crimes Act.
b. Relationship Between the General Crimes Act
and the Assimilative Crimes Act
When the General Crimes Act was initially passed in 1817,
defendants subject to the Act were prosecuted under federal criminal
law. However, because criminal jurisdiction is traditionally the province
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000); CANBY, supra note 26, at 156.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. While the first two exceptions still bear some significance, the
third exception is largely insignificant today. CANBY, supra note 26, at 164.
35. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S.
621 (1881).
36. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No.
94-1038, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1126; infra Part III.B.2.a.i.
37. See United States v. John, 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Burland, 441
F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1971). There is mixed precedent as to whether the Act applies to
victimless crimes by Indians, with the Eighth Circuit holding in 1997 that the General Crimes
Act applies to an Indian arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Compare United
States v. Thunder Hawk, 127 F.3d 705, 705 (8th Cir. 1997), with United States v. Quiver, 241
U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916).
38. Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1970), modified by 434 F.2d 1283 (9th
Cir. 1971).
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of the states, the United States lacked a comprehensive federal criminal
code.39 In order to fill these gaps, Congress passed the Assimilative
Crimes Act in 1825,'0 which provided that in areas of federal jurisdiction,
crimes not covered by federal law were to be prosecuted in federal
court, but prosecuted and sentenced pursuant to state substantive law."
A question arose as to whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
applied to crimes defined under state substantive law but prosecuted in
federal court.42 The question revolved around which took priority-
"uniform sentencing within the federal system 43 or "'equal treatment
for Indian and non-Indian offenders who commit certain offenses in
Indian country."'" The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Norquay
decided this question in favor of federal sentencing uniformity, and
Congress codified this decision by amending 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c) so as to
make the Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to Assimilative Act
offenses, thereby including the General Crimes Act, and the Major
Crimes Act. 5  Under this arrangement, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines apply, but state law sets the minimum and maximum
sentencing ranges.
2. The Major Crimes Act
In 1885, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act.4'7  The law was
passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision two years earlier in
Ex Parte Crow Dog,48 where the Court ruled that the federal
government does not have "jurisdiction over the murder of an Indian by
an Indian in Indian territory. ,'  The Major Crimes Act grants the
39. See CANBY, supra note 26, at 157-58.
40. Id. at 158; see also Gregory D. Smith, Comment, Disparate Impact of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country: Why Congress Should Run the Erie
Railroad into the Major Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 483,494 (2004).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
42. See CANBY, supra note 26, at 166-67; see also Sands, supra note 5, at 155. Compare
United States v. Bear, 932 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1990), with United States v. Norquay, 905
F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1990).
43. Norquay, 905 F.2d at 1161.
44. Id. at 1163 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 1125, 1125).
45. Sands, supra note 5, at 155.
46. Jon M. Sands & Robert J. McWhirter, Federal Sentencing Adventures in
Jurisdictional Wonderland: Blakely, Booker, and Special Federal Jurisdiction Issues, 18 FED.
SENT'G REP. 102,102 (2005); see infra Part II.A.5.
47. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
48. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
49. CANBY, supra note 26, at 165. For a more complete description of the story behind
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federal government jurisdiction over a specified set of major offenses
committed by an Indian in Indian country. ° Originally, the Major
Crimes Act conferred federal jurisdiction over seven offenses,51 but the
Act has subsequently been expanded in scope and in its present form
applies to fifteen classes of felonies. 2 The most recent addition to the
list of enumerated crimes came in 2006, when Congress amended the
Major Crimes Act to include "felony child abuse or neglect," 3 due to
concern "that a whole category of crimes against children [was] going
unaddressed."'
"Felony child abuse or neglect," along with burglary and incest, are
not federally defined offenses and are therefore prosecuted under state
substantive law, subject to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.5 The
Major Crimes Act's twelve other offenses, however, are federally
defined and are therefore tried and sentenced under federal substantive
law. This was not always the case, however. Prior to 1976, the Major
Crimes Act mandated that four federally defined offenses still be tried
according to state substantive law, but after two circuits held that this
disparity with the General Crimes Act violated Indians' due process
rights 6 Congress amended the Major Crimes Act so that all twelve
this case, see SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE 108-10 (1994).
50. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
51. The original seven felonies were "murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to
kill, arson, burglary, and larceny." § 9, 23 Stat. at 385.
52. The fifteen categories are: (1) "murder," (2) "manslaughter," (3) "kidnapping," (4)
"maiming," (5) "a felony under chapter 109A" (also known as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2248), (6)
"incest," (7) "assault with intent to commit murder," (8) "assault with a dangerous weapon,"
(9) "assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of [title 18])," (10)
"an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years," (11) "felony child
abuse or neglect," (12) "arson," (13) "burglary," (14) "robbery," and (15) "a felony under
section 661 of [title 18]," (also known as 18 U.S.C. § 661 (theft)). 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a). It
has also been held that the Major Crimes Act is applicable to firearms and conspiracy counts.
NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 7-8. Furthermore, it is important to
note that, so long as the offense under which the defendant is brought to court falls under the
Major Crimes Act, it is possible for the Indian defendant to be convicted of a lesser included
offense not listed under the Major Crimes Act. Id. at 8 n.25 (citing Keeble v. United States,
412 U.S. 205 (1973)).
53. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a).
54. S. REP. NO. 109-255, at 5 (2006). Prior to this amendment, "the federal government
[did] not have jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute acts of child physical abuse or neglect
unless they [rose] to the level of serious bodily injury or death." Id.
55. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 8-9. The General
Crimes Act, under the Assimilative Crimes Act, is also subject to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines although state law sets the minimum and maximum sentencing lengths. Sands &
McWhirter, supra note 46, at 102.
56. United States. v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
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federally defined offenses are prosecuted under federal substantive
law.57
Despite Congress's amendment to the Major Crimes Act in 1976, the
Major Crimes Act differs from the General Crimes Act in many
important ways. First, the Major Crimes Act gives jurisdiction to
offenses committed by an Indian against an Indian-jurisdiction that
was explicitly excluded under the General Crimes Act. 8 Second,
although the Major Crimes Act was passed in response to a crime by an
Indian against an Indian, the Act also applies to crimes by an Indian
against a non-Indian in Indian country. 9 This differs from the General
Crimes Act, where offenses by non-Indians against non-Indians in
Indian country are prosecuted in state court under state substantive law.
This creates sentencing disparity because an Indian committing a
"major" crime against a non-Indian in Indian country will be punished
according to federal law, while a non-Indian committing the same
offense in Indian country against a non-Indian is prosecuted under the
state system. While the Supreme Court in Antelope held that such
disparity is not unconstitutional,' as will be discussed later, that does not
mean that such disparity is not "unwarranted" for purposes of the
Federal Guidelines. In addition to creating disparate sentencing, this
also results in Native Americans being disproportionately subject to
federal jurisdiction. Indeed, the majority of federal prosecutions for
offenses such as assault, manslaughter, and certain sex offenses are
against Native Americans.61
Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 1974). At that time, the concern was that state
sentences were longer than federal sentences, so Indians suffered harsher sentences. Today
this concern is reversed, such that federal sentences are longer than corresponding state
sentences.
57. H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1125. Congress
purposely limited its amendment to correct only what the courts had construed to be
unconstitutional disparity. At the time, the Supreme Court was considering United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), to determine "the constitutionality of leaving to State
jurisdiction non-Indian against non-Indian crimes that take place in Indian country." H.R.
REP. No. 94-1038, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127 n.2. The Supreme
Court ultimately held that such disparity was not unconstitutional, and Congress chose not to
correct this disparity. See United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1990).
58. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), with 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
59. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005). Also, it is important to
note that jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act exists if any part of the crime occurred in
Indian country. United States v. Van Chase, 137 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 1998).
60. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 647-49.
61. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at i (focusing on
sentencing issues for these three offenses).
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3. Public Law 280
In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280,62 which delegated criminal
jurisdiction and limited civil jurisdiction in Indian country to six
"mandatory" states-Minnesota, 3  Alaska, California, Nebraska,
Wisconsin, and Oregon-thereby impacting twenty-three percent of
Native Americans residing on reservations in the contiguous forty-eight
states, and all Alaska natives.6' This law was passed in an effort to
combat lawlessness in Indian country during a period of time that has
been termed the "Termination Period" with respect to the federal
government's policy towards Indian tribes.6 The effect of the law is that
in states governed by Public Law 280, all crimes occurring in Indian
country, regardless of whether the offender or victim is Native
American, are prosecuted under state law in state court.
Prosecuting Native Americans under state law, free from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, eliminates the inherent disparity discussed in
this Article, but it comes at a heavy price-the impingement of tribal
sovereignty. Public Law 280 has been heavily criticized by Indian law
scholars,' and even President Eisenhower, when signing Public Law 280
62. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)); see also Timothy J. Droske, Comment, The New Battleground
for Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex Offender Registration in Indian Country, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 897 (2007).
63. Public Law 280 exempted the Red Lake Reservation from Public Law 280. 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a). Later, through retrocession, the Bois Forte Reservation reassumed criminal
jurisdiction.
64. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC LAW 280 AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY-RESEARCH PRIORITIES 3-4 (2005), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/209839.pdf.
65. The "Termination Period" lasted from 1940-1962 and was characterized by the goal
to assimilate Native Americans into United States society at large. Vanessa J. Jim6nez & Soo
C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
1627, 1662-65 (1998); see also Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between Criminal and
Regulatory: How Public Law 280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump Tribal
Sovereignty, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 449,452 (2004).
66. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, the preeminent expert on Public Law 280, has taken a
position that, despite Congress's intent that Public Law 280 reduce lawlessness in Indian
country, it has actually had the opposite effect, because tribal courts' power was limited and
tribes subject to Public Law 280 were cut out of significant federal funding opportunities. See
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1415-19 (1997). Public Law 280 has also been
criticized for stunting the development of tribal judicial systems and preventing tribal courts
from being respected as they were developing. Kevin K. Washburn & Chloe Thompson, A
Legacy of Public Law 280: Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota's New Rule for the
Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments with the Recent Arizona Rule, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 479, 521 (2004).
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into law, expressed "'grave doubts as to the wisdom of certain
provisions."'67 President Eisenhower was particularly troubled by the
law's lack of tribal consent, which he requested be added to the law the
following year.' Congress finally added this clause in 1968, but it did
not apply retroactively to tribes within the six mandatory states, or any
of the nine other states69 that had subsequently assumed partial Public
Law 280 jurisdiction.70 Public Law 280 is out of step with the federal
government's current policy of favoring tribal sovereignty7 1  and
tellingly, only one state has managed to assume Public Law 280
jurisdiction following the addition of the tribal consent clause.72 This is
unsurprising given that doing so would require tribes to acknowledge
state authority over them and would also effectively eliminate any tribal
criminal justice system previously in place. 3
4. Tribal Jurisdiction
Despite Congress's heavy delegation of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country to federal or state governments, in the absence of such
statutes, "tribal criminal jurisdiction over the Indian in Indian country is
complete, inherent, and exclusive., 71 While Public Law 280 effectively
67. Jim~nez & Song, supra note 65, at 1657-58 (quoting Statement by the President
upon Signing Bill Relating to State Jurisdiction over Cases Arising on Indian Reservations,
PUB. PAPERS 564 (Aug. 15, 1953)).
68. Id. at 1658 n.172.
69. The nine states were Nevada in 1955, South Dakota in 1957 (jurisdiction over
highways), Washington in 1957 (jurisdiction in eight subject areas), Florida in 1961, Idaho in
1963 (civil and criminal jurisdiction over seven subject matters, which can be expanded with
tribal consent), Montana in 1963 (jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation), North Dakota
in 1963 (assuming civil jurisdiction, by tribal consent), Arizona in 1967 (jurisdiction over
water quality, repealed in 2003, and jurisdiction over air quality, repealed in 1986), and Iowa
in 1967 (civil jurisdiction over the Sac and Fox Tribe). After the 1968 Amendment, in 1971,
Utah became the last state to accept Public Law 280 jurisdiction. Emily Kane, State
Jurisdiction in Idaho Indian Country Under Public Law 280, ADVOCATE, Jan. 2005, at 10, 10-
11.
70. Garrison, supra note 65, at 456.
71. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 66, at 1415-19; see also Washburn & Thompson,
supra note 66, at 521.
72. CANBY, supra note 26, at 253. Utah is the only state to have assumed Public Law
280 since the tribal consent clause was added. Id. In obtaining tribal consent, "Utah bound
itself to retrocede ... jurisdiction whenever a tribe requests it by a majority vote." Id. While
the General Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act no longer apply in the "mandatory" Public
Law 280 states, "optional" states that later adopt Public Law 280 assume criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country, but the Major Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act also remain in
effect. CANBY, supra note 26, at 235-36.
73. See CANBY, supra note 26, at 236-37.
74. CANBY, supra note 26, at 170 (citing Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)).
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wipes out tribal criminal justice systems,75 tribal criminal jurisdiction
remains more robust for those tribes subject to the General Crimes Act
and the Major Crimes Act. This is most strongly evidenced by the fact
that tribes hold exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by
an Indian against an Indian that are not covered by the Major Crimes
Act. 76 This effectively means that tribes hold exclusive jurisdiction over
misdemeanors where an Indian is both the defendant and the victim. 77
This exclusive jurisdiction results in a large number of prosecutions
being brought exclusively in tribal court.8  Congress, however, has
imposed a limit on tribal courts' sentencing ability. In 1968, Congress
passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, which, in addition to extending many
of the safeguards in the Bill of Rights to the tribes,79 also limited tribal
courts' sentencing authority to a maximum of one year's imprisonment,
a fine of $5,000, or both.8"
Tribes also share concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
75. CANBY, supra note 26, at 236-37 (noting that the lack of tribal criminal justice
systems is due to either a lack of need or a lack of resources); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)
(2000).
76. See CANBY, supra note 26, at 170. This is because crimes committed by an Indian
against an Indian in Indian country are specifically excluded under the General Crimes Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
77. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403,
410-11 (2004).
78. For example, in 2003, the Navajo Nation's tribal courts heard 27,602 criminal cases
compared to the United States Attorney's Office, which prosecuted 487 criminal cases arising
on the Navajo Nation. Id. at 412.
79. In describing the Indian Rights Act, Washburn states,
In addition to the freedoms of speech, assembly and exercise of
religion set forth in the First Amendment, the Indian Civil Rights Act
incorporated most of the criminal procedure protections found in the Bill
of Rights, such as the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements and the
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy, compelled self-
incrimination, and deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process, the Sixth Amendment's rights to notice, a speedy and public trial,
the right to confront witnesses, the right to compulsory process, and the
right to counsel, the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions on excessive bail,
excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, and even the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of equal protection. In addition, Congress
provided the same remedy for deprivation of rights by tribal courts and
tribal governments that are available against states for a state court's
deprivation of rights, that is, petitioning the courts of the United States for
a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 424-25 (citations omitted).
80. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
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government in a number of situations. For example, tribes have
jurisdiction over non-major crimes committed by an Indian against a
non-Indian, as does the federal government under the General Crimes
Act, so long as the Indian defendant has not been punished by the
tribe." Tribes also share concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
government over Indian defendants who have violated the Major
Crimes Act although tribal courts are subject to the sentencing
limitations imposed by the Indian Civil Rights Act.'
In sum, except in Public Law 280 states, tribes exercise exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over all non-major offenses by an Indian against an
Indian, and concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over all
non-major offenses by an Indian against a non-Indian, and all cases
where the federal government has jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act.
5. Criminal Jurisdiction Summary
The following is a summary of the interplay between federal, state,
and tribal criminal jurisdiction as it relates to Indian issues:83
" Crimes Occurring Outside Indian Country: All crimes occurring
outside Indian country, regardless of whether the offender or
victim is Indian, are exclusively under state criminal jurisdiction.
* Crimes Occurring in Public Law 280 States: All crimes, regardless
of whether the crime occurs in Indian country, or whether the
offender or victim is Indian, are under state criminal jurisdiction.
" Crimes Occurring Within Indian Country in Non-Public Law 280
States: The intersection of federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction is
set forth in the following chart:
81. CANBY, supra note 26, at 171; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
82. CANBY, supra note 26, at 171-72; Jim6nez & Song, supra note 65, at 1652.
83. For a helpful example of the jurisdictional relationship, see Smith, supra note 40, at
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* Tribal sentences are limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act to up to one year's
imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.
+ Burglary and Incest are not federally defined offenses and therefore are
prosecuted under state substantive law per the Assimilative Crimes Act.
# State substantive law governs per the Assimilative Crimes Act when there is
not a federally defined offense. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines apply, but
state substantive law provides the maximum and minimum sentences.
** However, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Thunder Hawk,4 that
the General Crimes Act applied to an Indian arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol.
B. Socioeconomic and Cultural Influences on
Criminal Justice in Indian Country
1. Broad Concerns
The administration of justice for Native Americans is unique for
reasons beyond the jurisdictional arrangement over Indian country. For
example, Native Americans as a whole, and particularly those living
within Indian country, endure higher rates of poverty, unemployment,
low education,85 crime rates, 6 and alcoholism 7 than the rest of the
84. 127 F.3d 705, 705 (8th Cir. 1997).
85. According to data compiled from the 2000 census, American Indians are
socioeconomically disadvantaged compared to the rest of the United States population in
every area, and these substandard conditions are only magnified when limited to American
Indians living in Indian country. See generally STELLA U. OGUNWOLE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES IN THE UNITED
STATES (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/censr-
28.pdf. The poverty rate among American Indians is more than double that of the total U.S.
population. Id. at 12 (showing that the percentage of American Indians living below the
poverty line in 1999 was 25.7%, compared with 12.4% for the total U.S. population). This
rate can be even higher on reservations. For example, in 1999, 41.5% of Navajo Nation
residents, 32.3% of Fort Peck Reservation residents, and 34.6% of Red Lake Reservation
residents had incomes of less than $14,999. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime,
and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 711 n.8 (2006) (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE
OF SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND
OFF-RESERVATION TRUST LAND 3 (2000), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/
2502430.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: FORT PECK RESERVATION AND OFF-
RESERVATION TRUST LAND 3 (2000), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/
2501250.pdf). This is largely due to high rates of unemployment. For example, the overall
Indian unemployment rate is forty-six percent, Center for Community Change, Native
American Background Information, http://www.cccfiles.org/issues/nativeamerican/
background/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008), and the average unemployment rate on Montana's
seven reservations is sixty-six percent, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, CALCULATION OF
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR MONTANA INDIAN RESERVATIONS (2005), http://dli.mt.gov/
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country. These socioeconomic conditions, as well as many tribes'
geographic isolation, Indian culture, and underlying racial tensions with
the surrounding population, all spill over into the administration of
justice for Native Americans. As Professor Kevin Washburn has
described in a recent article, these factors result in the alienation of
Native Americans within the criminal justice system, which often results
in Native Americans failing to be accorded fundamental constitutional
norms of criminal justice." Judges and commentators have also spoken
out on how these factors need to be accounted for in order to make the
criminal justice system equitable for Native Americans.89 While the
Eighth Circuit has taken some steps to counter these factors by
resources/Indianlabor market.pdf. However, employment alone is not enough to bring many
Indians above the poverty line. On those same Montana reservations, thirty-six percent of
people employed were still living below the poverty guidelines. Id. Across the country, the
median earnings for American Indians working full-time, year-round ($28,890 for American
Indian men, $22,762 for American Indian women) was substantially less than that for the rest
of the population ($37,057 for men, $27,194 for women). OGUNWOLE, supra, at 11.
Similarly, 27.2% of American Indians living outside Indian country, and 33.1% of those living
in Indian country have not graduated from high school, compared to 19.6% of the total U.S.
population. Id. at 17.
86. A recent study reported that American Indians are victims of violent crime at a rate
more than double that of the rest of the nation. STEVEN W. PERRY, AMERICAN INDIANS
AND CRIME iii (2004) (reporting that American Indians experienced violent crime at a rate of
101 violent crimes per 1,000 American Indians, compared to 41 per 1,000 persons for the total
U.S. population). Similarly, Native American women report rape at a level twice that of
white women, although it is not altogether clear to what degree this is due to a higher
occurrence of rape or higher reporting rates. Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First
Principles: The Sentencing Commission's Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal
Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 575 (2002) (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY
5 (1998) (reporting rape rates of 17.7% for white women and 34.1% for American Native and
Alaska Native women)).
87. Much of the crime in Indian country is attributable to high levels of alcohol abuse.
For example, sixty-two percent of violent crimes experienced by American Indians involved
alcohol, compared to forty-two percent overall for the nation. PERRY, supra note 86, at vi.
Furthermore, the arrest rate of American Indians for alcohol violations is approximately
double that for all races. Id. at 17. These violations include DUI, liquor law violations, and
drunkenness. Id. American Indians were arrested for DUIs at a rate of 479 per 100,000
people, compared to 332 per 100,000 for all races. Id. Additionally, American Indians were
arrested for liquor law violations at a rate of 405 per 100,000 compared to 143 per 100,000 for
all races. Id. For drunkenness, American Indians were arrested at a rate of 356 per 100,000
compared to 148 per 100,000 for all races. Id.
88. Washburn, supra note 85, at 710-13.
89. See, e.g., Kornmann, supra note 8, at 71. See generally S.D. ADVISORY COMM. TO
THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NATIVE AMERICANS IN SOUTH DAKOTA: AN
EROSION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
sac/sd0300/main.htm.
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affirming the use of downward departures in cases where Native
American defendants have displayed a "consistent effort[] to overcome
the adverse environment of [American Indian] reservation[s],"' the
reasoning of these decisions has been questioned and has not been
adopted by other circuits.
2. A Case Study in Native American Inequality-the South Dakota
Criminal Justice System
South Dakota serves as a prime example of the obstacles facing
Native Americans in the criminal justice system. In 1999, due to
concerns over racial tension and unfair treatment of Native Americans
in South Dakota's criminal justice system, the South Dakota Advisory
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights undertook a project
analyzing the administration of justice for Native Americans.91 The
South Dakota Advisory Committee held a public forum to gather
information on this issue.' The Advisory Committee's published report
said of the meeting that "[t]he expressed feelings of hopelessness and
helplessness in Indian Country cannot be overemphasized. 93 Native
Americans voiced feelings that racism "permeated" the federal and
state levels of justice and that crimes committed by Indians against
whites were prosecuted more vigorously than those committed by
whites against Indians.' Furthermore, the complex maze of criminal
jurisdiction led to problems of accountability and communication.95 In
addition, Native Americans were alienated from the criminal justice
process because they were underrepresented in employment in the local,
state, and federal criminal justice systems, and because they did not fully
participate in local, state, and federal elections.96 Compounding these
problems was a lack of redress for Native Americans because general
legal services, civil rights organizations, and government civil rights
oversight were limited in the state as a whole, and for Native Americans
90. United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1990).
91. See generally S.D. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 89.
92. Id. (meeting on Dec. 6, 1999, in Rapid City, South Dakota, where nearly one
hundred individuals addressed the forum).
93. Id. The Report went on to say, "Despair is not too strong a word to characterize the








C. An Example of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country and the
Resulting Sentencing Disparity-Aggravated Assault in South Dakota
A close analysis of aggravated assault in South Dakota provides a
useful illustration of the complexity surrounding criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country and the accompanying sentencing disparity experienced
by Native Americans. This example demonstrates the jurisdictional
issues discussed already and previews the use of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which are discussed in depth in the next section.
In South Dakota, the city of Pierre is sixty miles away from Fort
Thompson, the tribal headquarters of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe.
Assume that in both cities an Indian and a non-Indian are arrested for
aggravated assault.98 The situation set forth here is particularly salient
because federal sentencing of Native American defendants for
aggravated assault was the primary concern that gave rise to the South
Dakota Advisory Committee meetings. 99 In 2002, for example, Native
Americans nationally comprised 3.6% of all federal criminal defendants
but 36.9% of federal criminal defendants that were prosecuted for
assault.1" In South Dakota, the percentage of assault defendants who
are Native American is presumably much higher because Native
Americans comprise approximately half of all defendants federally
prosecuted in the state.' 1
97. Id.
98. Aggravated assault is the most heavily prosecuted crime under the Major Crimes
Act and therefore provides a good example for the impact of federal sentencing on Native
Americans. Concern over disparate sentencing for aggravated assault in South Dakota is
what gave rise to the formation of the Native American Advisory Group. NATIVE
AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 30-31.
99. Id. at 31. This meeting was largely responsible for the formation of the Native
American Advisory Group. Additionally, in response to the work by the South Dakota
Advisory Committee, the Governor of South Dakota contracted with local empiricists to see
if state criminal justice data supported the Advisory Committee's findings. Braunstein &
Feimer, supra note 1, at 171. South Dakota is not a Public Law 280 state, so state criminal
jurisdiction over American Indians is limited to crimes occurring outside Indian country.
While the initial study on this data revealed disparities that validated the concerns raised by
the South Dakota Advisory Committee, id. at 189, a later study, headed by the same author,
concluded that the disparity was due to socioeconomic factors rather than race. Richard
Braunstein & Amy Schweinle, Explaining Race Disparities in South Dakota Sentencing and
Incarceration, 50 S.D. L. REV. 440, 474 (2005).
100. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
ANNUAL REPORT 15 tbl.4 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/table4.pdf.
101. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRE-BOOKER FISCAL YEAR 2005 GUIDELINE
STATISTICS: SOUTH DAKOTA, in SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
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1. Prosecuting the Indian Defendant for the Assault in Indian Country
Aggravated assault is one of the fifteen offenses enumerated under
the Major Crimes Act."° Therefore, the Indian defendant committing
the assault on the Crow Creek Reservation will be prosecuted in federal
court for aggravated assault regardless of whether the victim was Indian
or non-Indian."°3
Once the Indian defendant is found guilty, he will be sentenced by
the district judge according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Under the 2005 Guidelines, the base offense level for aggravated assault
is fourteen, with a three- to seven-level increase depending on the
severity of the victim's bodily injury. '  In South Dakota, federal
sentences for assault during 2005 averaged forty-seven months.' This
current base offense level for assault is one level lower than it was in
2002 when concerns were raised in South Dakota regarding assault
convictions for Native Americans."" Under the 2002 Guidelines, the
average federal sentence for assault in South Dakota was 53.3 months in
length.' 7°
The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe will also have concurrent jurisdiction
ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/sd-preO5.pdf;
POST-BOOKER FISCAL YEAR 2005 GUIDELINE STATISTICS: SOUTH DAKOTA, in
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/sd.post05.pdf. It is not possible to find data on the race
of federal defendants for particular crimes by state, nor is it possible to find data on the
sentencing disparities for Native Americans by offense.
102. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (providing that the statute applies
to "[a]ny Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely .... assault resulting in serious bodily injury").
103. The Indian defendant will be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 113(6) (2000) ("Assault
resulting in serious bodily injury, [is punishable] by a fine under [Title 18] or imprisonment
for not more than ten years, or both.").
104. 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2A2.2.
105. 2005 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, supra note
2, at 12, 25 (reporting forty-nine-month mean sentence in South Dakota for assault during
fiscal year 2005 pre-Booker and a forty-five-month mean sentence in South Dakota for
assault during fiscal year 2005 post-Booker). This was higher than the national mean for
assault during fiscal year 2005, which was thirty-seven months pre-Booker and forty-four
months post-Booker. Id.
106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2 (2002) (base offense
level fifteen for aggravated assault). The Native American Advisory Group in its 2003 report
recommended reducing the base offense level by two, but only a one-level reduction was
ultimately adopted. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 34; 2005
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2A2.2.
107. 2002 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, supra note
2, at 10 (comparing the mean national sentence for assault that year, which was 38.7 months,
to the mean federal sentence in South Dakota).
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over the Indian defendant for the assault, regardless of whether the
victim was Indian or non-Indian. However, tribes rarely exercise this
concurrent jurisdiction, and its sentences are limited by the Indian Civil
Rights Act to a maximum of one year's imprisonment, a fine of $5,000,
or both.18
2. Prosecuting the Non-Indian Defendant for the Assault in Indian
Country
Criminal jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendant who committed
the crime on the Crow Creek Reservation is dependent upon whether
the victim was Indian or non-Indian. If the victim was Indian, the
defendant will be subject to federal jurisdiction under the General
Crimes Act.' °  Because aggravated assault is a federally defined
offense,"' the defendant will be prosecuted under federal, rather than
state, substantive law."' Under the 2005 Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
the non-Indian defendant would face an average federal sentence of
forty-seven months.1
12
Criminal jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendant switches from
the federal government to the State of South Dakota if the assault
victim was also non-Indian. The non-Indian defendant would then be
prosecuted in South Dakota state court under South Dakota substantive
law."3 According to 2002 statistics, the average sentence for white
defendants convicted of assault in South Dakota state courts was thirty-
four months."4
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2000).
111. If no federally defined offense exists, the defendant is prosecuted in federal court
under state substantive law per the Assimilative Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
112. 2005 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, supra note
2, at 12, 25. Reports indicate that post-Booker, federal sentences for Native Americans are
10.8% higher than those for white defendants. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT
ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 84 (2006)
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/Booker-Report.pdf (The 10.8% actually applies to the
race classified as "other," which the Report states refers mostly to Native American
offenders.).
113. The non-Indian defendant will be prosecuted under section 22-18-1.1 of the South
Dakota Codified Laws, a class 3 felony. S.C. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-1.1 (2006). Note that it
is within Congress's authority to amend the General Crimes Act so that non-Indian
defendants committing crimes against non-Indians in Indian country would be subject to
federal jurisdiction.
114. Braunstein & Feimer, supra note 1, at 194 (reporting that the mean actual sentence
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3. Prosecuting the Indian Defendant for the Assault Outside Indian
Country
The Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act do not have any
applicability outside Indian country. As a result, a crime committed by
an Indian outside Indian country, such as assault, falls under state
jurisdiction and outside the reach of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
In 2002, the average South Dakota state sentence for Native Americans
convicted of assault was twenty-two months.115
4. Prosecuting the Non-Indian Defendant for the Assault Outside
Indian Country
In this case, the non-Indian defendant is subject to state jurisdiction
and an average sentence of thirty-four months."6
5. Sentencing Disparity
As this example illustrates, under the 2002 Guidelines, Native
Americans prosecuted in South Dakota federal court received average
sentences thirty-one months longer than Native Americans prosecuted
in state court and nineteen months longer than whites prosecuted in the
South Dakota state courts. Despite recommendations by the Native
American Advisory Group to reduce this disparity, under the current
Guidelines, federal sentences for assault in South Dakota during 2005
were still twenty-five months longer than those for Native Americans
sentenced in state court and thirteen months longer than those for
whites sentenced by the state."7
Although the jurisdictional arrangement surrounding Indian country
disproportionately impacts Native Americans, non-Indians subject to
jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act also fall victim to this
sentencing disparity. Therefore, an argument can be made that
downward variances should also be permitted for these non-Indian
defendants. However, due to the courts' interpretation of the General
Crimes Act, non-Indians are only subject to federal jurisdiction for
offenses committed in Indian country when the victim of the crime was
Indian. In contrast, Indians may be prosecuted under the Major Crimes
length for whites convicted for assault in South Dakota state courts was 1,017.6961 days).
115. Id. (reporting that the mean actual sentence length for American Indians convicted
for assault in South Dakota state courts was 672.9373 days).
116. Id.
117. Compare 2005 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET,
supra note 2, at 12, 25, with Braunstein & Feimer, supra note 1, at 194.
20081
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Act regardless of whether the victim was Indian or non-Indian. While it
is within Congress's authority to correct this disparity by holding non-
Indian against non-Indian crime subject to federal jurisdiction, Congress
has not taken this step in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has
held that such disparity does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. 118 As a result, Native American defendants, when sentenced
for a crime involving a non-Indian victim, have an additional basis for
arguing against disparity between federal and state sentences.
Furthermore, although non-Indians may be federally prosecuted for
offenses occurring in Indian country under the General Crimes Act, in
actuality, crimes such as federal assault remain largely a Native
American crime, with nearly a third of the federal prosecutions for
assault in South Dakota involving a Native American defendant." 9
III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES PRE-BOOKER AND
THEIR IMPACT ON NATIVE AMERICAN DEFENDANTS
Prior to the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in United States v.
Booker, federal judges were required to adhere to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which heavily cabined judicial discretion in
sentencing. As a result, judges were largely unable to consider
mitigating factors surrounding crime in Indian country when sentencing
Native American defendants. This Part will trace the history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines from their inception until Booker. At
the same time, it will discuss the impact the Guidelines have had on
Native American defendants and responses to this issue that have
gained limited traction along the way. The Part will then conclude by
discussing other proposed solutions to correcting the sentencing
disparity experienced by Native American defendants under the pre-
Booker regime.
A. The Sentencing Reform Act's Enactment and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Creation
1. The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act's enactment, judges had
virtually unfettered discretion in imposing sentences below the statutory
118. United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977)); H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1126).
119. Braunstein & Feimer, supra note 1, at 194.
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maximum penalty for a crime,12 and the Parole Commission had
immense discretion in determining the amount of time a defendant
actually served in prisonY. In response, in 1984 Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which sought to achieve honesty,
uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. 2 2 The main features of
the Act were to create the United States Sentencing Commission, which
would promulgate federal sentencing guidelines, 23 and to abolish the
federal parole system and replace it with a requirement that defendants
serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences before becoming
eligible for release.'
The SRA set forth how district court judges were to use the
Sentencing Guidelines that would be promulgated by the Sentencing
121Commission. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), judges are to consider seven
factors: (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant"; (2) "the need for the sentence
imposed" in order to, among other things, "provide just punishment,"
serve as a deterrent, "protect the public," and provide the defendant
with proper training, care, or treatment; (3) "the kinds of sentences
available"; (4) the Federal Sentencning Guidelines; (5) "any pertinent
policy statement . . .issued by the Sentencing Commission"; (6) "the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7)
"the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense." 1
2 6
The SRA requires that district court judges sentence defendants in
accord with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines but does provide under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) that judges may depart from the Guidelines when
there is a circumstance "that the [Sentencing] Commission did not
adequately consider when formulating the Guidelines.' 27  In
determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into
consideration, the SRA states that the court may only consider "the
120. Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 305 (1996).
121. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUs.
L. REV. 279, 282 (2006).
122. 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 1AL.
123. Gelacak et al., supra note 120, at 308; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (West 2006 & Supp.
2007).
124. Bowman, supra note 121, at 282-83.
125. Gelacak et al., supra note 120, at 310.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
127. Gelacak et al., supra note 120, at 310; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
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sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission,"' and if the court chooses to depart, it must
provide its reason for doing so,"' which then becomes the basis for
appellate review."3 With these standards in place, President Reagan
signed the SRA into law in 1984, and the Sentencing Commission was
then formed to promulgate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'31
2. The United States Sentencing Commission's Creation
a. The SRA's Guideposts to the United States Sentencing Commission
The United States Sentencing Commission was charged with the
task of creating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.3 2  The SRA
provided guideposts for the factors the Commission should consider and
incorporate into the Guidelines as they deemed appropriate.3 3 These
included a list of seven factors, "among others," related to the
seriousness of the offense,' and a list of eleven factors, also "among
others," related to "offender characteristics. 1 35 However, in considering
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
130. Gelacak et al., supra note 120, at 310.
131. Id. at 311.
132. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
133. 28 U.S.C.A.§ 994(a).
134. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Simplification Draft Paper, The Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984: Principal Features, available at http://www.ussc.gov/SIMPLE/sra.htm [hereinafter
Simplification Draft Paper]; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(c), which lists these seven factors:
(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which
mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including
whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a
number of persons, or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the
commission of the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the
Nation as a whole.
135. Simplification Draft Paper, supra note 134; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(d) (listing the
eleven factors as the following: (1) age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; (4) mental and
emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's culpability or
to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant; (5) physical condition,
including drug dependence; (6) previous employment record; (7) family ties and
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"offender characteristics," the SRA required "that the guidelines and
policy statements [be] entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin,
creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders."'' 36  With these guiding
principles in hand, the Commission then engaged in lengthy public
hearings, research, and debate before the Guidelines went into effect on
November 1, 1987. 37
b. The Discussion of Departures for Indian Crime During the Sentencing
Commission's Hearings
The circumstances surrounding the sentencing of Native Americans
arose during the course of these public hearings. 138 Prior to the SRA,
federal judges and the federal criminal justice system in general were
able to take into account the unique circumstances surrounding Indian
crime. For example, there is evidence that federal judges, prosecutors,
and public defenders in the Southwest were sensitive to the Navajo
Indians' sense of justice.' 39  The importance for judges to be able to
exercise discretion with respect to Indian crime was brought to the
Commission's attention. This argument seemed to gain some traction
with then-Commissioner (and now Justice) Breyer, who recognized the
unique nature of these cases and appeared to urge trial courts to use
their discretion to depart in cases involving Native American
defendants." ° Unfortunately, the concerns expressed in these public
hearings and the response by then-Commissioner Breyer were not
reflected when the Commission promulgated its Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 4'
responsibilities; (8) community ties; (9) role in the offense; (10) criminal history; and (11)
degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood).
136. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(d).
137. Gelacak et al., supra note 120, at 311.
138. Jon M. Sands, Departure Reform and Indian Crimes: Reading the Commission's
Staff Paper with "Reservations," 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 144, 145 (1996) ("[T]he Commission
heard testimony by Tova Indritz, Federal Defender, District of New Mexico, Michael Katz,
Federal Defender, District of Colorado, and others, about the culturally different and unique
context presented by Indian crimes in Indian Country.").
139. Palcido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 357,378 (1994).
140. Id. at 379 n.112 (quoting Tova Indritz, Testimony before the Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice 239, 240-42 (Denver, Colorado, November 5,
1986)).
141. Sands, supra note 138, at 144.
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3. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Promulgation
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect on November 1,
1987.142 The Guidelines operate by employing a sentencing matrix that
looks at the defendant's "total offense level" and "criminal history
category.' ' 143  Once the court has calculated the guideline-specified
sentence, the court is permitted to depart from this sentence length
when it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance ... that was not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission...."'" The Commission designed each guideline "as
carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct
that each guideline describes.', 15 Therefore, when a case arises that falls
outside the "heartland," the court may award a departure.1
6
The Commission has placed some limitations on what factors may be
considered as grounds for departure. Importantly for Native
Americans, the Guidelines Manual states that race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socio-economic status "are not relevant in the
determination of a sentence,' 14' although the Eighth Circuit has
seemingly circumvented this restriction in the Big Crow line of cases.'
48
The Guidelines also prohibit the consideration of "[l]ack of [g]uidance
as a [y]outh,' 149 which individuals such as Judge Kornmann have
criticized as prohibiting judges from considering the poor upbringing
that many young Native American defendants receive."" Beyond these
"specific exceptions, however, the Commission does not intend to limit
142. See Gelacak et al., supra note 120, at 311.
143. Id.; see also 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, at 376-77.
144. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2006) [hereinafter
2006 GUIDELINES MANUAL] (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)) (omission
in original).
145. Id.
146. For a discussion of the "heartland," see generally Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81
(1996). Although the holding that circuit courts are to apply an abuse of discretion standard
of review, rather than de novo review, was ultimately overruled by Congress in the Feeney
Amendment, the case provides a good summary of the application of the Guidelines and
departing when a case falls outside the "heartland."
147. 2006 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 144, § 5H1.10.
148. United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990). The ban on
consideration of culture as a ground for departure has been met with much criticism. See
generally Gomez, supra note 139. But see generally Kelly Diffily, Comment, PROTECTing
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Look at Congress' Prohibition of Cultural Differences in
Federal Sentencing Determinations in the Wake of the 2003 PROTECT Act, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
255 (2005).
149. 2006 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 144, § 5K2.0(d)(1).
150. Kornmann, supra note 8, at 72.
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the kinds of factors (whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the
guidelines) that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual
case.,,St
In 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act, and while the bill was
pending, the Feeney Amendment was added to the legislation.'52 In its
initial form, the amendment would have "eliminated all unenumerated
downward departures and all downward departures for family ties,
diminished capacity, aberrant behavior, educational or vocational skills,
mental or emotional conditions, employment record, good works, or
overstated criminal history."'53 The Amendment was narrowed in its
final form, however, and these departure restrictions were limited to
crimes of "pornography, sexual abuse, child sex, and child kidnapping
and trafficking,""' although it did "impose[] a two-year moratorium on
Guideline amendments... creat[ing] new downward departure grounds
or loosen[ing] the amendment's restrictions" on downward departures.
5
While this two-year moratorium has passed, the departure restrictions
placed on sex crimes persist. 156 This is particularly limiting for Native
Americans because sex offenses are an area where Native Americans
are disproportionately represented in federal court,'57 but the Feeney
Amendment severely restricts courts' ability to provide downward
departures for such defendants.
B. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Native Americans
The restrictions the Federal Sentencing Guidelines placed upon
sentencing judges impacted Native American defendants in two key
ways: (1) by failing to allow judges to downward depart to correct the
inherent disparity between federal and state statutory sentence lengths,
and (2) by prohibiting the consideration of race, national origin, and
socio-economic status in providing a downward departure.' Despite
these restraints, judges devised creative solutions to account for these
151. 2006 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 144, § 1AI.1. This section also includes a
summary of factors courts are not permitted to consider.
152. Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial
Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295,295 (2004).
153. Id. at 295-96 (citing H. Amend. 19 to H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003)).
154. Id. at 296 (citing PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(a)-(b), 117 Stat. 650,
667-68 (2003) (codified as amended at scattered statutes of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.)).
155. Id. at 297 (citing PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(2), 117 Stat. at 673).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
157. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 19-20.
158. See 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5Hl.10.
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factors in sentencing Native Americans. However, the reach of these
decisions is limited because it is difficult to justify these departures
under the express language of the Guidelines Manual or the SRA. This,
in turn, has led to a number of calls for reform of the Guidelines Manual
or Congressional action. In 2000, largely in response to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights' work analyzing the impacts of the
criminal justice system on Native Americans in South Dakota, the
Sentencing Commission created the Native American Advisory Group.
This Group was charged with determining whether Native Americans
are unfairly treated under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and if so,
how that can be redressed. 9 This section will discuss these various
proposed solutions and their relative merits.
1. Court-Based Solutions
a. Big Crow and Its Progeny-the Eighth Circuit's Departures for the
Unique Circumstances of Life on a Reservation
Prior to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' promulgation, the
Sentencing Commission considered the unique circumstances
surrounding crime in Indian country."6 These considerations however,
were not incorporated into the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
promulgated by the Commission in 1987. Rather, the Sentencing
Guidelines seemingly closed the door on departures based on "culture"
because the Guidelines traced the language of the SRA that race, sex,
sational origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status "are not
relevant in the determination of a sentence.' ' 161 Despite this mandate,
the Eighth Circuit, which deals regularly with Indian affairs, affirmed
downward departures in a line of cases stretching from 1990 to 1999
where the district judge departed based upon the unique circumstances
surrounding life on an Indian reservation.
i. United States v. Big Crow"6
In United States v. Big Crow, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
159. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at i.
160. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
161. 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5H1.10.
162. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 9; see also United
States v. Decora, 177 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60 (8th Cir.
1993); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990). But see United States v.
Weise, 128 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1997).
163. 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990).
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downward departure for Big Crow, a resident of the Pine Ridge
reservation in South Dakota.'" Big Crow had been convicted of assault
with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury."'
Under the Guidelines, Big Crow's sentence was to be thirty-seven to
forty-six months,' 66 but the district court downward departed, giving Big
Crow a sentence of twenty-four months imprisonment and two years
supervised release, plus treatment for alcohol abuse. 67 The district court
based this departure upon Big Crow's intoxication when the offense
occurred, his lack of a criminal record, excellent employment history,
''consistent efforts to overcome the adverse living conditions on the Pine
Ridge reservation," and a number of letters written on Big Crow's
behalf by leaders in the community.' 68
On appeal, Big Crow conceded that his intoxication and lack of a
prior criminal record were not justifiable reasons for a departure, but
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the downward departure on the other
grounds provided by the district court.'69 The Eighth Circuit focused on
"Big Crow's excellent employment record and his consistent efforts to
overcome the adverse environment of the Pine Ridge reservation. ' ' 7°
The court provided statistics on the widespread poverty on the Pine
Ridge reservation 7' and contrasted that with Big Crow's steady
employment, strong review from his employer, and consistent financial
support of his family.7 1 In sum, the court concluded that "Big Crow's
excellent employment history, solid community ties, and consistent
efforts to lead a decent life in a difficult environment are sufficiently
unusual to constitute grounds for a departure from the Guidelines in
this case.'
73
In a footnote following the discussion of conditions on the Pine
Ridge reservation, the Eighth Circuit stated that the Guidelines' policy
164. Id. at 1332.
165. Id. at 1327-28 (noting that the incident occurred when Big Crow had a number of
people over at his house, all of whom had been drinking, and Big Crow got in a fight with
somebody and hit him with a piece of firewood).
166. Id. at 1329.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1331.
170. Id.
171. The reservation had an unemployment rate of seventy-two percent and a per capita
annual income of $1,042. Id. at 1331-32.
172. Id. at 1332 (noting that Big Crow had worked as a forestry aid and firefighter for




statement that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-
economic status "are not relevant in the determination of a sentence,
174
exceeded the Sentencing Reform Act's requirement of "neutrality"
regarding these factors.1 7' The majority then justified its departure on
the Senate Judiciary Committee's statement that "neutrality" regarding
these factors "is not a requirement of blindness., 176 The dissenting judge
pounced upon this footnote, stating that Guidelines section 5H1.10 is
clear that "race, national origin, and socioeconomic status" cannot be
•. 177
considered. The dissent further argued that the majority's reliance
upon the Senate Judiciary Committee was misplaced because 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) is clear that legislative history cannot be considered by the
court. 17' Despite this disagreement with the majority's reasoning, the
dissenting judge conceded that the district court had awarded a just
sentence, stating that "[a]s a practical matter, one wonders why the
government attacks [the sentence] here. There are some things that are
better left alone, and Big Crow's sentence is one of them.,
179
ii. Big Crow's Legitimacy Affirmed
Courts and commentators have noted the tension between Big Crow
and Guidelines section 5H1.10,1 but the Eighth Circuit's decision is not
an anomaly. Three years later, in United States v. One Star, the Eighth
Circuit again affirmed a downward departure where mitigating
circumstances associated with life on an Indian reservation were "'of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.""'18 The Eighth
Circuit also affirmed Big Crow in United States v. Decora'82 a 1999 case
where an Indian defendant had pled guilty to assault with a dangerous
183
weapon. The district court judge downward departed from a
174. 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5H1.10.
175. Big Crow, 898 F.2d at 1332 n.3.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1332 (Wollman, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1332-33 (indicating that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) allows "consider[ation of]
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary in determining whether the
Sentencing Commission adequately took a circumstance into consideration").
179. Id. at 1333.
180. See Diffily, supra note 148, at 273-74; see also Smith, supra note 40, at 519-22.
181. 9 F.3d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1990)).
182. 177 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 677. In Decora, the defendant pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon
(shod feet) for kicking an officer after being arrested for speeding and failing to obey a stop
sign while driving under the influence. Id.
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recommended sentence of thirty-seven to forty-six months to three
years probation and participation in a drug and alcohol treatment
program.' 84 The judge based this departure on the facts surrounding the
case, which took it "out of the heartland of the assault with dangerous
weapon cases that he usually saw in his courtroom" and that "there were
unusual mitigating circumstances in the case, namely, the adversity
defendant Decora had faced on the reservation and the 'remarkable
resilience' he had nonetheless shown in his determination to succeed.'
85
The Eighth Circuit affirmed this decision, stating it was within the
judge's authority under Sentencing Guidelines section 5K2.0 86 and the
court's prior decisions in Big Crow and One Star. 187
iii. Limits on Big Crow
The Eighth Circuit's decisions in Big Crow, One Star, and Decora
carve out a downward departure ground for Native Americans, but it is
limited to Indian defendants whose situations are factually distinct. For
example, in United States v. White Buffalo,'8' the Eighth Circuit did not
affirm a downward departure when the defendant, unlike Big Crow and
One Star, "ha[d] no dependents to support," "presented no evidence of
his standing in the community," and did not have a solid work record. 89
The Eighth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v.
Weise, 9 where the record did not indicate that anything about the
"reservation environment skewed Weise's opportunities," and, unlike
the court in Big Crow, the Weise court did not receive any letters from
community members on Weise's behalf.' Looking at the Eighth
Circuit's opinions on this issue in their entirety, falling victim to the
184. Id.
185. Id. at 677-78 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that when the
incident occurred, Decora was only one semester away from earning his college degree.
Furthermore, many of Decora's teachers sent letters stating that he was "well respected in his
community and at the University and that he shows great promise as a community leader and
a role model." Id. at 678.
186. Id. at 679 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0
cmt. (1998) ("The Commission does not foreclose the possibility of an extraordinary case
that, because of a combination of such characteristics or circumstances, differs significantly
from the 'heartland' cases covered by the guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory
purposes of sentencing, even though none of the characteristics or circumstances individually
distinguishes the case.")).
187. Id.
188. 10 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 1993).
189. Id. at 577.
190. 128 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 1997).
191. Id. at 674.
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conditions on an Indian reservation is insufficient to qualify for a
downward departure, but overcoming these reservation conditions
moves the case outside the "heartland" of cases contemplated by the
Guidelines.
Although Big Crow and its progeny provide the only circuit court-
approved method for taking the unique circumstances surrounding
Native American defendants into consideration at sentencing, the
decisions are a clear affront to the Guidelines' mandate that race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status "are not
relevant in the determination of a sentence.""' Therefore, although Big
Crow is commendable in many ways from a strict policy perspective, the
decision is in too great of conflict with the plain language of the SRA to
be a defensible legal position.
b. Minimizing Disparity Through Narrow Statutory Interpretation
Big Crow, One Star, and Decora stand out as a unique set of cases in
which a court openly admitted that reservation conditions were a
relevant factor in providing a downward departure. Courts, however,
have also minimized sentencing disparity by interpreting federal statutes
narrowly so that they do not apply to Indian country. Judge Kornmann
has provided an example of this in the public housing context. Congress
requires that those "sell[ing] drugs from 'protected locations,' such as a
'housing facility owned by a public housing authority,"' are to be
punished twice as harshly. 93 Congress based this increased penalty upon
the issues surrounding drug dealing in urban public housing, where
tenants have to deal with drug trafficking on a daily basis.'9" However,
Congress failed to consider that most public housing in Indian country
exists in rural areas and are single-family dwellings.9  As a result, Judge
Kornmann, of the District of South Dakota, has interpreted "public
housing authority" under the statute to be distinct from an "Indian
Housing Authority" so that Native Americans are not subject to the
heightened penalties. 96 While this tactic is suitable in situations such as
this one, its applicability is limited to those cases where it is reasonable
for the court to construe the underlying statute narrowly.
192. See 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5H1.10.
193. Kornmann, supra note 8, at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 72. At the time Judge Kornmann's essay was published, his interpretations
had not been appealed.
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c. Candidly Correcting for Disparity Between
State and Federal Sentences
Attempts to openly correct for disparity between federal and state
sentences have largely been rejected by the courts. This issue first arose
prior to the SRA's passage and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
creation. In the 1977 case United States v. Antelope, the Supreme Court
addressed whether equal protection under the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause was violated "by subjecting individuals to federal
prosecution by virtue of their status as Indians.' ' 97 The Court first found
that the laws subjecting Native Americans to federal criminal
jurisdiction were "based neither in whole nor in part upon impermissible
racial classifications. 198 Furthermore, the Court concluded that because
Native Americans prosecuted pursuant to the Major Crimes Act "enjoy
the same procedural benefits and privileges as all other persons within
federal jurisdiction,"' 99 the only remaining basis for the Native
Americans' equal protection claim was the disparity between federal
law and Idaho law."°° The Court then rejected this argument, stating
that "[u]nder our federal system, the National Government does not
violate equal protection when its own body of law is evenhanded,
regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same subject
matter."20 1
While Antelope appears to strike a severe blow at courts' ability to
correct for sentencing disparity experienced by Native Americans, it is
important to recognize that the challenge in that case came in the form
of an equal protection claim. Therefore, although the Court notes in a
footnote that "state law does not constitute a meaningful point of
reference for [Native Americans to] establish[] a claim of equal
protection, ' 22 variances from the Guidelines are permissible whenever a
case falls outside the "heartland," not only when awarding a within-
Guidelines sentence would be unconstitutional.0 3 Therefore, Antelope
by itself does not close the door on a federal court considering
corresponding state sentences when sentencing a Native American
defendant, although pre-Booker circuit courts squarely rejected
197. 430 U.S. 641,642 (1977).
198. Id. at 647.
199. Id. at 647-48 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212 (1973)).
200. Id. at 648.
201. Id. at 649 (footnotes omitted).
202. Id. at 649 n.12.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990).
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departures outside the Indian law context based upon federal-state
sentencing disparity.204
Antelope also provides useful support for arguing that Native
Americans should be granted a unique ground for departure under the
Guidelines. In another footnote in the case, the Court points out that it
"has consistently upheld federal regulations aimed solely at tribal
Indians, as opposed to all persons subject to federal jurisdiction."2 '
While this statement provides justification for the jurisdictional system
created by the Major Crimes Act, it also provides a basis for creating a
ground for downward departure aimed specifically towards Native
Americans, although such a departure would have to be reconciled with
the bar on departures on the basis of national origin. °6
2. Legislative and Administrative Solutions
a. Prior Congressional Responses to Sentencing Disparity
for Native Americans
i. Congressional Decisions Not to Correct for Federal-State Sentencing
Disparity
Prior congressional responses to Native American sentencing
disparity have focused upon promoting uniformity for federal
defendants. In 1976, for example, Congress amended the Major Crimes
Act to eliminate disparity between that Act and the General Crimes
Act.20 7 At the time, the Major Crimes Act only applied to thirteen
enumerated offenses, and the Act mandated that six of these crimes be
defined under state substantive law, 2°4 even though four of these offenses
204. Smith, supra note 40, at 516 n.158.
205. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 649 n.11. The Court goes on to say, "Indeed, the Constitution
itself provides support for legislation directed specifically at the Indian tribes. As the Court
noted in Morton v. Mancari, the Constitution therefore 'singles Indians out as a proper
subject for separate legislation."' Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974))
(internal citation omitted).
206. Antelope makes clear that "[f]ederal regulation of Indian tribes ... is governance of
once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "'racial" group
consisting of "Indians .... Id. at 646 (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24). As a result, the
ban on departures on the basis of "race" does not apply to American Indians. Instead, the
issue would revolve around whether a departure based solely upon a defendant's status as an
American Indian violates the bar on departures based upon "national origin."
207. Indian Crimes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-297, 90 Stat. 585.
208. H.R. REP. No. 94-1038, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1126.
Four of the offenses were to be "defined and punished" according to state law, while two
were to be defined under state law but punished by imprisonment "at the discretion of the
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were federally defined crimes2' 9 In contrast, the General Crimes Act
stated that federal substantive law should apply in all cases in which
federal law exists; otherwise, state substantive law is applicable. The
distinction between these acts meant that Indians would be prosecuted
under state law, while non-Indians would be prosecuted under federal
law.21 Congress was spurred to action after the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits held that this disparity "denie[d] Indians due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment" '211 and amended the Major Crimes
Act so that federal substantive law applied to all federally defined
offenses.212
In contrast, Congress has not acted to eradicate federal-state
disparity in sentencing for Native Americans."3 While Congress could,
for example, amend the General Crimes Act so that non-Indian
defendants committing offenses against non-Indians are prosecuted
under federal law, it has failed to do so.2"' This does not necessarily
mean that such disparity is warranted. Instead, Congress's differing
courses of action can be explained as reflecting that Congress is only
willing to act in this area when such disparity rises to the level of a
constitutional violation."'
Congress has also made it clear that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are to apply to assimilative crimes and the Major Crimes
court." Id.
209. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1129. Note that incest and burglary are
not federally defined offenses. Id. at 5 n. 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1129.
210. Id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1127.
211. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1128. The two cases were United States v.
Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.
1974). Note that Congress focused on situations where an Indian faced the possibility of
longer imprisonment than a non-Indian, H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 at 4 n.5, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1128 n.4, although the Report noted that it can also work the other way,
where an Indian will be treated more leniently. H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 at 4, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1128.
212. H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1129.
213. See United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Court's holding in Antelope "has not been of any apparent concern to Congress").
214. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1038 at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1126.
215. Indeed, this is supported by House Report 1038 regarding the Indian Crimes Act of
1976. There, Congress amended the Major Crimes Act in response to the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits' holdings that the disparity at issue violated due process. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N at 1128. Congress purposely avoided addressing the disparity that was being
litigated at that time in Antelope, as the case was pending. Id. at 3 n.2, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1126. After the Court ruled in Antelope that such disparity did not violate
equal protection, Congress did not respond to the matter.
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Act.216 While this does reflect a greater concern on Congress's part
regarding disparity between defendants prosecuted in the federal
system, rather than disparity between non-Indians prosecuted in state
court and Indians prosecuted in federal court for the same offense,
congressional intent in this regard is limited to those circumstances
where Indians are prosecuted in federal court under state substantive
law. Additionally, Congress's determination that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines should apply to assimilative crimes and the
Major Crimes Act does not foreclose the possibility that downward
departures may be granted to Native American defendants under the
Guidelines.
ii. Congressional Decisions Accounting for Disproportionate Impacts
on Native Americans
Congress, on at least two occasions, has displayed a willingness to
carve out exceptions for Native American defendants when criminal
legislation would have a disproportionate impact on them as a group.
(a) The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994
The first example of this is with respect to the Federal Death Penalty
Act of 1994, which made many federal crimes capital offenses.217 This
law had the potential to disproportionately impact Native Americans,
but the Act included "[s]pecial provisions for Indian country":
Notwithstanding sections 1152 and 1153, no person
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of an Indian tribal
government shall be subject to a capital sentence under
this chapter for any offense the Federal jurisdiction for
which is predicated solely on Indian country (as defined
in section 1151 of this title) and which has occurred
within the boundaries of Indian country, unless the
governing body of the tribe has elected that this chapter
have effect over land and persons subject to its criminal
jurisdiction.218
216. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1602, 104 Stat. 4789, 4843
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000)). This amendment codified the Eighth Circuit's holding
in United States v. Norquay. See 905 F.2d 1157, 1163 (8th Cir. 1990).
217. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (2000).
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The effect of this provision is that Native Americans subject to federal
jurisdiction, due to the jurisdictional scheme in Indian country, will not
receive the federal death penalty unless the tribe has elected for the Act
to have effect. The legislative history indicates that this provision's
inclusion was premised on a concern for tribal sovereignty and was
designed to permit tribes, like state governments, to be able to elect
whether the death penalty applies within their jurisdiction. 9 While this
exception for Indian country does not appear to be overtly motivated by
concern about the law's disproportionate impact on Native Americans
or resulting sentencing disparity,2 ' an earlier attempt to pass federal
death penalty legislation in 1990 did take into account the Act's impact
on Native American defendants.
In 1990, the House considered the death penalty legislation that was
not passed until 1994. At that time, the House Subcommittee on Crime
engaged in lengthy hearings to determine for which crimes the death
penalty should apply.22' Testimony from Ms. Ada Deer and Ms. Tova
Indritz, who reflected the interests of Native Americans, played a
critical role in the Subcommittee's decision "that the death penalty
should not be based on a geographic happenstance., 22 In particular, the
Subcommittee determined that the death penalty should not apply to
federal murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111223 after Ms. Indritz informed the
219. See 137 CONG. REC. 15,980, 15,981 (1991) (statement of Sen. Inouye) ("[T]his
amendment accords to tribal governments a status similar to that of the State governments,
namely that tribal governments, like State governments, can elect whether or not to have the
death penalty apply for crimes committed within the scope of their jurisdiction."); see also id.
(statement of Sen. Inouye) ("All we are asking by this amendment is to give the sovereign
people in the sovereign governments of Indian country the same right [as states]."); id. at
15,982 (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("The Senator from New Mexico is for the death
penalty, but I believe that you can be for the death penalty and be for something else, and I
happen to be for something else, and that happens to be Indian sovereignty and Indian self-
determination."). See generally United States v. Martinez, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1027
(D.N.M. 2007) (discussing the legislative history).
220. See Martinez, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 ("There is no indication that Congress
intended for the law to affect the prosecution of individual defendants for murder; rather, the
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3598 seems to be focused on empowering the sovereign nations-
not individual defendants.").
221. H.R. REP. No. 101-681(I) at 86 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6490.
222. Id. at 88, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6492. Ms. Ada Deer was the
Chairwoman of the Board of Directors of the Native American Rights Fund, and Ms. Tova
Indritz was the Federal Public Defender for the District of New Mexico. Id. at 88, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6492.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). This statute only applied to a murder
committed "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Id.;
H.R. REP. No. 101-681(I) at 88, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6492.
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Subcommittee of the disproportionate impact this would have on Native
Americans, as illustrated by the fact that in 1988 and 1989, nearly sixty-
four percent of all federal first degree murder prosecutions were of
Indians for crimes occurring within Indian country.224 Furthermore, the
Subcommittee was also persuaded by "one of the anomalous results
which could occur" if the death penalty was enacted for crimes
stemming from federal lands jurisdiction:
[Ms. Indritz] cited the example of a case involving a
killing by an Indian and a non-Indian of another Indian
on an Indian reservation. If the killing occurred in a
State which does not have the death penalty, the Indian
could face the death penalty under Federal law while the
non-Indian would be tried in State court where he would
not face the same penalty for the identical crime.225
Although the final federal death penalty legislation included the general
provision for Indian country rather than specifically excluding the
federal murder offense, it is still significant that the Subcommittee, in
1990, showed concern for the Act's disproportionate impact on Native
Americans and corresponding sentencing disparity. Furthermore, while
the final provision regarding Indian country appears to have been
primarily motivated by concerns regarding tribal sovereignty, the
ultimate reach of the enacted provision is more beneficial to Native
American defendants because the exclusion is not limited solely to the
federal murder offense.
(b) "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation
Congress created a similar "special provision for Indian country" in
another piece of 1994 legislation-the "three strikes and you're out"
act.226 The bill contained a number of "specifically enumerated offenses
that automatically qualify as a strike," as well as "general standards for
224. H.R. REP. No. 101-681(I) at 88, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6492.
225. Id. Importantly, I think this "anomalous result" is incorrect. In terms of the
jurisdiction, the example would be accurate if the victim were a non-Indian, but under the
stated example, with the victim being Indian, the non-Indian offender would actually be tried
under the same federal murder statute per the General Crimes Act. See supra Part II.A.5.
226. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 70001, 108 Stat. 1982, 1984; H.R. REP. No. 103-463, at 3 (1994). This legislation was enacted
due to concerns regarding high violent crime rates in America, recidivism, and an inadequate
response by the criminal justice system. Id. at 3-4.
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what other crimes, not specifically enumerated in the bill, also qualify as
a strike., 27 Congress included a "[s]pecial provision for Indian country"
nearly identical to that in the Federal Death Penalty Act:
No person subject to the criminal jurisdiction of an
Indian tribal government shall be subject to this
subsection for any offense for which Federal jurisdiction
is solely predicated on Indian country (as defined in
section 1151) and which occurs within the boundaries of
such Indian country unless the governing body of the
tribe has elected that this subsection have effect over
land and persons subject to the criminal jurisdiction of
the tribe.
The legislative history is sparse with respect to what motivated the
inclusion of this provision, but the Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice passed this provision approximately one month after
hearing testimony regarding "disparity against Native-Americans. 229
Therefore, while the "special provision for Indian country" in both the
Federal Death Penalty and "three strikes and you're out" Acts may
have been primarily motivated by concerns for tribal sovereignty, at
least the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice was also
motivated in part by concern regarding sentencing disparity and the
disproportionate impact these pieces of legislation would have on
Native Americans.
(c) A Limit on Tribal Exceptions-Child Protection Laws
Congress's willingness to provide such exceptions for Indian country
is not absolute. Since the 1994 acts,230 the House has expressed an
unwillingness to provide similar exceptions for Native Americans with
227. Id. at 4.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(6) (2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-463, at 14.
229. H.R. REP. No. 103-463, at 6. The Record states that the testimony regarding
disparity against Native Americans came in part from "Gerald Goldstein, president-elect of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Marc Mauer, assistant director of The
Sentencing Project in Washington, D.C.[;] and Reverend Bernard Taylor, Chairman of the
civic group, Black Expo Chicago." Id.
230. Note that in 1994, Congress also provided a similar provision for Indian country
with respect to the age at which a juvenile may be tried as an adult in the federal system. See
Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV.
779, 830 n.279 (2006).
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respect to crimes against children."' The Children's Safety Act of 2005
would have enacted a host of different provisions in order "to address
the growing epidemic of sexual violence against children."232 The House
Committee on the Judiciary pushed this bill through without any
exceptions for Native American defendants. Dissenters criticized this in
the House Report, stating:
H.R. 3132's creation of additional federal crimes will
disproportionately affect Native Americans who are
significantly over-represented in the federal criminal
system. H.R. 3132 would add felony child abuse and
neglect to the Major Crimes Act, and would impose a
host of harsh new mandatory minimum sentences for
existing offenses under the Major Crimes Act. This will
have a disproportionate impact on Native Americans
because they comprise the vast majority of people
prosecuted in federal court for offenses listed in the
Major Crimes Act, and their sentences are already
significantly longer than the sentences imposed in state
courts on others for the same conduct. 3
The Children's Safety Act of 2005 passed the House by a vote of 371 to
52 but did not move through the Senate, with both houses instead
adopting the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,
which contained many of the same provisions existing in the Children's
Safety Act of 2005, including increased sentences for sex offenses. 4
Congress's failure to carve out an exception for Native Americans may
reflect a congressional unwillingness to correct for Native American
sentencing disparity as it applies to crimes against children, but it is
noteworthy that unlike the death penalty and "three strikes and you're
out" legislation, it appears that Congress, in this case, had "no
deliberative consultation with the representatives from the group most
231. See H.R. REP. No. 109-218(I) (2005).
232. Id. at 20. The Act was to do this by strengthening the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act, enacting new DNA-related legislation, "adopt[ing] new mandatory
minimum penalties for violent crimes committed against children," increasing mandatory
penalties for sex offenses against children, and creating new foster care requirements. Id. at
20-21.
233. Id. at 256 (footnotes omitted).
234. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587.
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affected by the legislation, Native Americans." '235 In sum, Congress has
expressed a willingness to exempt Native Americans from certain
federal criminal penalties in circumstances where the penalties'
disparate impact on Native Americans has been brought to the
legislature's attention.
b. Reducing Disparity by Increasing Departure Grounds
Under the Sentencing Guidelines
A number of judges and commentators have recommended dealing
with the issue of disparate sentencing for Native Americans by
increasing the grounds for departure under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Judge Kornmann, for example, has suggested including sentencing
factors that permit judges to consider the poor upbringing many young
Native American defendants receive, as well as the corresponding state
sentence a Native American would receive if tried in state court.
236
Similarly, Jon M. Sands, an Assistant Federal Public Defender and
frequent commentator on Indian law, has suggested implementing a
departure for "Dependent Sovereign Nation Status,, 237 and, more
broadly, for "Culture." '238 While such proposed modifications to the
235. H.R. REP. No. 109-218(I), at 256. Note that this was certainly true at the time the
House Committee on the Judiciary recommended the Children's Safety Act of 2005. A
review of the legislative history of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act in
Thomas and Westlaw did not yield any information regarding the impact this law would have
on American Indians.
236. Kornmann, supra note 8, at 73.
237. Sands' proposed departure would read:
5K2.17 Dependent Sovereign Nation Status
Recognizing the unique relationship of the Indian tries [sic] as
dependent sovereign nations, a departure from the guidelines to reflect
the special status may be warranted in certain circumstances. Such
circumstances would relate to the cultural context that reduces or
lessens culpability. A reduced sentence may be appropriate for the
nature and character of the offense provided that the tribal interest in
adequate punishment and deterrence is not reduced.
Sands, supra note 138, at 146-47.
238. The "Culture" departure would read:
5H1.13 Culture
A defendant's cultural background or beliefs are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be within the
applicable guideline range. There are limited circumstances where a
defendant is plainly less culpable because motivation for the offense
arises in a unique cultural context.
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Sentencing Guidelines are over ten years old, 39 these additional grounds
for departure have not been added to the Guidelines and would require
an exception to the Sentencing Reform Act's requirement that the
Guidelines be "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders.,
240
c. Eliminating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
Applicability to Indian Country
Rather than increasing the potential for judicial responsiveness to
Native Americans under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, at least two
papers have proposed eliminating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
applicability to Native American defendants altogether. In a comment
in the Hamline Law Review, Gregory D. Smith proposed that Congress
modify the Major Crimes Act so that all Indian defendants be
prosecuted and sentenced under the corresponding state law, and that
Congress amend the Sentencing Reform Act so that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are inapplicable to the Major Crimes Act.24 ' Like
the proposed modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines, Smith's
proposal would solve the disparity problem, but the proposal is unlikely
to receive congressional support, as it is in conflict with the Guidelines'
goal of uniformity in sentencing, and is unnecessary post-Booker.
Despite the surface appeal of Smith's proposal, there is no reason to
think that it will be adopted by Congress. As discussed in the previous
section, Congress has been unwilling to adopt sweeping legislative
reform to correct federal-state sentencing disparity experienced by
Native Americans.242 Instead, Congress, in a 1990 amendment to the
SRA, explicitly expressed its intent that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines apply to crimes prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act and
Assimilative Crimes Act.243 Although Congress has at times carved out
Id. at 147.
239. Sands' paper was published in 1996.
240. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
241. Smith, supra note 40, at 529. The Major Crimes Act would be modified to read:
"Any Indian who commits... [any of the enumerated offenses] ... within Indian country,
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing like offenses
outside Indian country, and within the boundaries of the state within which the offense arose."
Id. (omissions in original). This would also require a slight modification to the Sentencing
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2000), replacing the word "including" with the word
"excluding," so that it would be clear that state substantive law would apply to the sentencing
phase in such a circumstance. Smith, supra note 40, at 529.
242. See supra Part III.B.2.a.i.
243. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1602, 104 Stat. 4789, 4843 (1990)
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exceptions for Native Americans from federal criminal penalties,2" there
is no indication that Congress has changed course from its intention that
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines apply in Indian country.
Moreover, Smith's proposal conflicts with the SRA's purpose of
fostering uniformity in federal sentencing.2 5 Although the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines have rightly been criticized for being overly rigid,
federal judges' use of a standardized sentencing system fosters an
important procedural uniformity distinct from any resulting alignment in
actual sentence lengths between similarly situated defendants. This
procedural uniformity would be defeated if Native American defendants
were completely exempted from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Booker, despite its repudiation of the
Guidelines as a mandatory sentencing regime, clearly stated that judges
are "require[d] ... to consider the Guidelines" at sentencing, in addition
to a host of other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . 6
Despite these weaknesses in Smith's proposal, there were few other
options pre-Booker available to combat Native American sentencing
disparity. However, as will be discussed later in this Article, the
Guidelines post-Booker are only advisory in nature, meaning that courts
now have the discretion to downward depart to correct for Native
American sentencing disparity. Furthermore, not only do courts now
have the power to correct such disparity, they are also perhaps the
branch best suited to address this issue as questions involving sentencing
and jurisdiction are areas of judicial expertise.247
Judge Bruce D. Black, a district court judge in the District of New
Mexico, has argued for a solution similar to Smith's, but where Native
Americans would be sentenced under tribal sentencing guidelines rather
than federal or state requirements.246 Under this approach, tribes would
be able to craft penalties based upon the unique concerns facing their
reservations and would be subject to congressional oversight in the same
(codifying United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1990)).
244. Supra Part III.B.2.a.ii.
245. See 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 1AI.1.
246. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005).
247. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574
(1985) ("[C]ourts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary [jurisdictional]
fine tuning than is the legislature."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412
(1989) (noting that the "accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch" in
sentencing is "a matter uniquely within the ken of judges").
248. Bruce D. Black, Commentary on Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of
Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 218, 218 (2005).
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manner as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 9 While this approach
would powerfully affirm tribal sovereignty,25° its administrative burdens
make it largely infeasible. There are over five hundred tribes in the
United States, and there are wide disparities in the infrastructure of
tribes' judicial systems. Furthermore, a significant administrative
burden exists if Congress is to be expected to oversee over five hundred
different sentencing guidelines. Therefore, while Judge Black's and
Gregory Smith's proposals both carry some surface appeal, their
adoption and effective implementation are unrealistic.
d. The Native American Advisory Group Report-Modifying the
Recommended Sentencing Range in the Guidelines to
Account for Native American Sentencing Disparity
Although much of the discussion over how to address sentencing
issues for Native American defendants has been relegated to legal
journals, the United States Sentencing Commission directly confronted
this matter by forming the Native American Advisory Group in 2002.5
The Group was formed in response to the allegations of discrimination
in the criminal prosecution of Native Americans in South Dakota
discussed earlier in this Article.252  The Group's charge was to
"'[c]onsider any viable methods to improve the operation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in their application to Native Americans under
the Major Crimes Act.' 253  In the Group's final report, it did not
recommend increased departure opportunities but instead
recommended modifying the recommended sentencing ranges to
account for both sentencing disparity and the unique circumstances
surrounding reservation life.2M
i. The Group's Recommendations
The Group focused its attention on three offenses that
disproportionately impact Native Americans-manslaughter, sexual
abuse, and aggravated assault.25
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 10.
252. Id.; supra Part II.C.
253. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 11 (alteration in original).
254. See id. at ii-v.
255. Id. at i.
[91:723
2008] NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING DISPARITY
(a) Manslaughter
The Group chose to address involuntary manslaughter because
nearly seventy-five percent of federally prosecuted cases for this charge
involved Indian defendants, typically in cases of alcohol-related
vehicular homicide.256 Due to concerns over drunk driving in Indian
country and requests by U.S. senators to increase penalties for
homicides committed while driving drunk,257 the Group recommended
increasing the offense levels so that the sentencing range would be more
than doubled.258 Specifically, the Group recommended increasing the
base offense level for involuntary manslaughter to eighteen, along with
a four-level increase if alcohol or drugs were involved, a two-level
increase if the actions involved multiple homicides, and a two-level
increase if the offense involved a weapon.259 Because the primary
concern regarding manslaughter was related to drunk driving homicides,
the Group did not have any sweeping recommendations for voluntary
manslaughter.' 6  Notably, the Group's recommendations for
manslaughter were not informed by issues of sentencing disparity and
instead were focused on the prevalence of drunk driving in Indian
country. While drunk driving is admittedly a serious offense deserving
of severe punishment, the punishment should be administered even-
handedly. Prior to the Group's recommendation, federal-state disparity
in this regard punished Native Americans more harshly,26' but the
256. Id. at 14-15. Although most cases involved Indian defendants, the total number of
prosecutions for this charge are relatively small. For example, in 2000 and 2001, the total
number of involuntary manslaughter cases was less than eighty. Id. at 15.
257. Id. at 15.
258. Id. at 17. For example, under the recommendations, the base offense level for
involuntary manslaughter for drunk driving, with a criminal history of category I, would be
twenty-two and would be reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility. Id. This
offense level of nineteen would lead to a sentence range of thirty to thirty-seven months,
"which is more than double the range previously set for such cases." Id.
259. Id. at 16. When the Group first formed, the base offense for reckless involuntary
manslaughter was fourteen, and it was ten for criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter.
Id. at 15-16. Prior to the publication of the Group's Report, Congress amended the
Guidelines to increase the base offense level for reckless involuntary manslaughter to
eighteen and to twelve for criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 16. This
amendment did not alter the Group's recommendations. Id.
260. Id. at 18-19. The Group did not recommend any change to the base offense level,
and its only recommendation was to provide a two-level increase for the use of a weapon and
a four-level increase for the use of a firearm. Id. at 18.
261. Judge Kornmann notes that under federal law, unlike South Dakota's state law, if
death of a minor is caused during a drunk driving accident, the sentence can be increased by
up to ten years. Kornmann, supra note 8, at 71. The impaired Native American is still subject
to this additional penalty even if the driver of the other vehicle was at fault for the accident.
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Group's recommendation only served to further that disparity rather
than resolve it.
(b) Sexual Abuse Offenses
Unlike its recommendations for manslaughter, the Advisory Group's
recommendations for sexual abuse offenses were informed by state and
federal sentencing disparity.6 The Group noted that this disparity was
only compounded by the then-recently enacted PROTECT Act. 63 The
PROTECT Act substantially increased the penalties for sex offenses26
for the primary purpose of "restor[ing] the government's ability to
prosecute child pornography offenses successfully., 26 The PROTECT
Act was particularly unfair to Native Americans because it exacerbated
the already existing federal-state sentencing disparity for the purpose of
combating an issue that is not a prevalent problem in Indian country.
26
Despite the Group's acknowledgment of the gross sentencing
disparity that existed, particularly in light of the PROTECT Act, the
Group "elected not to recommend any specific changes to the
Guidelines that would directly reduce or eliminate the sentencing
disparity identified. '267  Instead, the Group offered two
recommendations. First, the Group recommended that the Sentencing
Guidelines be modified to separate "travel offenses," which would
uniformly be subject to federal jurisdiction, from those sex crimes that
largely target Native American defendants.2" Second, the Group
recommended that a sex offender treatment program be established,
where successful completion of the program would result in a sentence
reduction.269 While these recommendations, as the Group noted, "may
indirectly reduce the sentencing disparity," it is somewhat troubling that
Id. Judge Kornmann reflects the sentiment that while the penalty itself may be appropriately
harsh, it needs to be equally administered. Id.
262. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 19-20.
263. Id. at 23-24.
264. Id.; see also PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21,117 Stat. 650 (2003).
265. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 24 n.42 (emphasis
omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 25.
268. Id. at 25-26. The Sentencing Commission at the time was already considering
removing "travel offenses" from U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 2A3.2 and
placing them in a new section, section 2G1.3. Id. Note that this recommendation did not
include any specifics on how the relative offense levels under the Guidelines should be
different.
269. Id. at 26-30.
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the Group candidly acknowledged the existing disparity, and purposely
"elected not to recommend any specific changes ... that would directly
reduce or eliminate the sentencing disparity identified. 27
°
(c) Aggravated Assault
The Group was particularly concerned about federal-state
sentencing disparity arising from aggravated assault prosecutions.271 In
South Dakota, for example, the average state sentence for assault was
twenty-nine months but was thirty-nine months for federal assault
sentences in the state.272 Even more strikingly, in New Mexico, the
average state sentence for assault was six months, while the average
federal assault sentence in the state was fifty-four months.2 73  The
Group's recommendation to reduce the base offense level for assault by
two levels was specifically designed to address this disparity, but it was
admittedly "a conservative approach . . . guided by the South Dakota
data" rather than the more disparate New Mexico data.274 While this
recommendation was certainly a step in the right direction, by the
Group's own admission, it fell short of fully eliminating the sentencing
disparity on this front. 75
ii. Implementation of the Group's Recommendations
The Group's recommendations were an admittedly conservative
approach to remedying the sentencing disparity experienced by Native
American defendants in the federal system. While the Group's
recommendations were, for the most part, implemented by the time the
2005 Sentencing Guidelines Manual was published, this was not
uniformly the case. For example, with respect to involuntary
manslaughter, the current base offense level for reckless conduct is at
eighteen, which mirrors the Group's recommendation.276  The
270. See id. at 25.
271. See id. at 30-31. This was partially due to the fact that assaults constitute the
highest percentage of offenses prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act, and while Native
Americans constitute less than two percent of the U.S. population, they represent about
thirty-four percent of people in federal custody for assault. Id.
272. Id. at 32-33.
273. Id. at 33 (noting that the low sentencing average for New Mexico state sentences is
partially based on low-level offenses that would not generally be prosecuted in federal court).
274. Id. at 34. The Group relied on the South Dakota data "because there was some
concern that the sentences in New Mexico were not representative of those in other states."
Id.
275. Id.
276. Compare id. at 16, with 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2A1.4.
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Sentencing Guidelines, however, provide a four-level increase for all
"offense[s] involv[ing] the reckless operation of a means of
transportation," while the Group recommended a four-level increase
only for cases where the defendant was driving while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.277 With respect to sexual abuse offenses,
the 2005 Sentencing Guidelines do include a separate Guideline for
"travel offenses," which carry a base offense level of twenty-four, as
opposed to statutory rape under section 2A3.2, which has a base offense
level of eighteen.278 The recent enactment of the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act in 2006, however, has furthered sentencing
disparity experienced by Native Americans.2 79 Finally, while the 2005
Sentencing Guidelines reflect a reduction in the base level offense for
aggravated assault, it was only reduced by one, from fifteen to fourteen,
rather than the two-level reduction recommended by the Group.2
3. Summary
Since the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' inception, there have been
a number of proposals to minimize the sentencing disparity experienced
by Native Americans and to accommodate the unique circumstances
surrounding life on a reservation. While Big Crow and its progeny
represent the greatest inroad the courts have made in this regard, Big
Crow's holding is nearly impossible to legitimately reconcile with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' prohibition on the consideration of race,
sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status,28' and the
decision fails to address the fundamental federal-state disparity affecting
all Native American defendants tried in federal court under the Major
Crimes Act. Congress has also taken action to correct criminal laws'
disparate impact on Native Americans, but such concern has primarily
focused on concern over tribal sovereignty and disparate sentencing for
Native Americans compared to other federal defendants and has not
extended to Congress's recently passed child safety legislation.
The Native American Advisory Group's Report is significant for
277. Compare 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2A1.4, with NATIVE
AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 16.
278. Compare 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2G1.3, with 2005
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2A3.2.
279. See Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587.
280. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2 (2003), and
2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 2A2.2, with NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY
GROUP, supra note 1, at 34.
281. See 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5H1.10.
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seriously attempting to remedy the sentencing disparity experienced by
Native Americans. Unfortunately, while the Group's efforts are
commendable, its final recommendations fall far short of fully realizing
this goal and were not fully implemented in the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Group's recommendations still failed to account for sentencing
variations from state to state, and furthermore, even in cases where the
Advisory Group explicitly identified sentencing disparity as a significant
concern, such as sexual abuse, it candidly admitted its recommendations
were not designed to directly reduce or eliminate such disparity.
The only way to fully eradicate the current federal-state sentencing
disparity for Native Americans would be for Congress to adopt Smith's
proposal and modify the Major Crimes Act and SRA so that Native
Americans would be tried and sentenced in federal court under state
substantive law, without the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, or to follow
Judge Black's recommendation and allow tribes to create their own
sentencing guidelines. Such action, however, seems unlikely to occur
given Congress's explicit intent that the Guidelines apply to the Major
Crimes Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act. Furthermore, completely
exempting Native American defendants from the Guidelines would
frustrate the SRA's goal of uniformity. The courts, therefore, are the
only immediately available avenue for correcting Native American
sentencing disparity. Moreover, it is proper for the courts to take
responsibility for correcting this disparity because the judiciary holds
unique expertise in matters of sentencing and jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, prior challenges to federal sentences based on federal-
state disparity were soundly rejected by the circuit courts.2 As the rest
of this Article will discuss, however, the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in United States v. Booker and recent downward variances by
federal courts based on the disparity created by "fast track" programs
breathe new life into the degree of discretion district court judges may
be permitted to take in sentencing Native American defendants.
IV. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER AND THE POST-BOOKER
LANDSCAPE-AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIVE
AMERICAN DEFENDANTS?
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Booker, 2 3 which, at first blush, appeared to undo the past twenty years
of federal sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the
282. See Smith, supra note 40, at 516-19.
283. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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decision, the Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
unconstitutional as applied and remedied this by making the Guidelines
"effectively advisory," rather than mandatory.2' Some cheered this
decision for freeing judges from the Guidelines while others viewed it
critically as opening the door to unfettered judicial discretion. 5 With
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines relegated to an advisory role, it
would appear that post-Booker judges would be free to consider federal-
state sentencing disparity and the uniqueness of life on a reservation to a
greater degree in sentencing Native American defendants. However,
while many commentators expected federal sentences to drastically
change post-Booker, many studies have shown that the federal
sentencing landscape has not changed significantly.
This Part will provide a brief overview of the Booker decision and
how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are to be applied in the
decision's aftermath. It will then discuss the impact Booker has had on
Native American sentencing. The final Part of this Article will then
discuss the post-Booker debate over non-Guidelines sentences to
remedy "fast-track" and crack-powder sentencing disparity and how the
arguments for downward variances in those areas provide a basis for
awarding non-Guidelines sentences to remedy the federal-state
sentencing disparity experienced by Native Americans under the Major
Crimes Act.
A. The Booker Decision
The Booker decision was sweeping in scope but hardly unexpected.
In 2000 and 2004, the Supreme Court decided cases signaling that the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was in doubt. In
Apprendi v. New Jersey, a 2000 opinion, the Court ruled that "any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." 86 While the decision dealt with a state judge and New Jersey
statutes, the four dissenting judges expressed concern that the holding
could be extended to undermine the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.8
Four years later, in Blakely v. Washington,' the Court relied upon its
284. Id. at 245; see also Bowman, supra note 121, at 280.
285. Bowman, supra note 121, at 280.
286. 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000).
287. Id. at 543-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing
Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REv. 163, 169-70 (2005).
288. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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ruling in Apprendi to find the State of Washington's Sentencing Reform
Act in violation of the Sixth Amendment because it required judicial
fact-finding in order to apply an exception sentence. 9 This 5-4 decision
once again signaled that the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines was in question.2
The next year, the Court decided Booker and held that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional on the same grounds as
Apprendi and Blakely. 9' Justice Breyer served as the critical swing vote
in the case and saved the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from being
completely invalidated. Although Breyer dissented from the majority
opinion holding the Guidelines unconstitutional,' 92 he fashioned a
remedy for the majority's conclusion by modifying the Sentencing
Reform Act so that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were advisory
rather than mandatory.293  Although Booker made the Guidelines
advisory, Justice Breyer emphasized that judges were still required to
consider the Guidelines and Congress's goals and purposes in creating
the Sentencing Commission when sentencing defendants. 94
Furthermore, while the decision stripped the Sentencing Reform Act of
the section governing the standard of review for appealed sentences,
Justice Breyer emphasized that the Act implicitly provided for an
"unreasonableness" standard of review on this front.295 Justice Breyer's
remedy saved the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but it was unclear
after Booker exactly how the lower courts were supposed to respond to
the decision.
B. Native American Federal Sentencing Post-Booker
Even though post-Booker sentences, in general, have not been
radically different than those before the decision,2  it would be
289. Id. at 305.
290. See Yellen, supra note 287, at 171.
291. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005); see Yellen, supra note 287, at
171.
292. See Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 326-34 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
293. Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court in part). To do this, the Court
eliminated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which mandated judges to sentence defendants in
accordance with the Guidelines, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which included numerous
references to § 3553(b)(1). Id. at 259.
294. Id. at 264.
295. Id. at 264-65.
296. Post-Booker, 85.9% of sentences are either within the sentencing range or are
government-sponsored departures, which is not substantially different than the rate of 90.6%
prior to the PROTECT Act or 93.7% after the PROTECT Act. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
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reasonable to hypothesize that the increased judicial discretion post-
Booker would result in district court judges varying from the Guidelines
more regularly when sentencing Native Americans, whether to account
for federal-state sentencing disparity or the unique circumstances
surrounding life on a reservation. Counterintuitively, however,
multivariate analysis has shown that post-Booker, Native American
offenders' sentences are 10.8% higher than those for white offenders. 97
This finding is difficult to reconcile with the attention the Native
American Advisory Group and various judges have paid to the issue of
unwarranted sentencing disparity experienced by Native Americans.
Despite the trend of convicting Native Americans to longer sentences,
as the next section will discuss, the post-Booker debate surrounding fast-
track sentencing and the crack-powder sentencing disparity provides
judges with a blueprint for awarding non-Guidelines sentences to
account for the sentencing disparity endured by Native American
defendants.
V. ACCOUNTING FOR "UNWARRANTED SENTENCING DISPARITIES" IN
POST-BOOKER SENTENCING-FAST-TRACK PROGRAMS AND
THE 100:1 CRACK-POWDER SENTENCING RATIO
While Booker's actual impact on sentencing has thus far not been
radical, and the issue of Native American sentencing disparity has
received little attention, a fierce debate has arisen regarding the
reasonableness of post-Booker, non-Guidelines sentences to account for
disparity within select districts that provide early disposition programs
and for the 100:1 crack-powder ratio.298 The manner in which courts
have handled sentencing in these areas, particularly the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement in United States v. Kimbrough2" that the
crack-powder sentencing ratio is not mandatory, provide valuable
insight into the courts' ability to similarly correct for Native American
sentencing disparity post-Booker. This Part will therefore discuss the
treatment of both these issues in the courts.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 46.
297. Id. at 84 ("This association also was found in 2 of the 7 time periods from 1999
through the post-Booker period."). The 10.8% actually applies to the race classified as
"other," which the Report states refers mostly to Native American offenders. Id.
298. Id. at 32-33. The Report focused on two issues in discussing key appellate
sentencing issues post-Booker--early disposition programs and crack-cocaine sentencing
disparity. Id.
299. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
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A. Fast- Track Sentencing Disparity
For certain federal districts close to the Mexico/U.S. border, over
half the criminal docket is comprised of immigration cases.3 °° Prior to
the creation of fast-track programs, the administrative burden of these
cases resulted in many defendants either being civilly deported or
pleading to misdemeanors. °1 To address this burden on the system, in
the mid-1990s many border districts created fast-track programs. The
purpose of the programs was to induce defendants to plead guilty by
offering below-Guidelines sentences to those who did so.3°2
1. Fast-Track Programs After the PROTECT Act
Fast-track programs were legitimized by the 2003 PROTECT Act.3 °3
The Act directed the Sentencing Commission to promulgate what is now
United States Sentencing Guidelines section 5K3.1, whereby fast-track
districts may provide up to a four-offense-level downward departure for
participation in its early disposition program.3" The PROTECT Act
also required that, in order for a fast-track program to be approved in a
district, the local United States Attorney must submit a proposal to the
Attorney General for his approval.05 As of March 2006, the Attorney
General had approved fast-track programs in sixteen of the ninety-four
federal districts in the country, with many high-immigration districts
not yet participating in the program.3 7 Ironically, Congress's approval
of these programs amounted to government-endorsed sentencing
disparity, even though one of the "stated purpose[s] of the PROTECT
Act was to reduce the number of downward departures.,
38
300. Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy
Paradox of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on "Fast-Track" Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 517, 520 (2006).
301. Id.
302. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2005).
303. Id.; see PROTECT Act, § 401(m)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 667, 675
(2003).
304. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 140-41.
305. McClellan & Sands, supra note 300, at 527.
306. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 141.
307. McClellan & Sands, supra note 300, at 523 (stating that "the District of Nevada, the
District of Utah, the New York districts, the Florida districts, and certain divisions in the
Southern District of Texas" are not yet offering fast-track plea bargains.).
308. See id. at 526.
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2. Fast-Track Disparity in the Courts
The existence of fast-track programs resulted in illegal immigrants
being subject to vastly different sentences, depending upon whether
they were arrested in a fast-track district like the District of Southern
California or in a non-fast-track district like those in New York. In
some cases, defendants in non-fast-track districts face sentences nearly
twice as long as corresponding sentences under a fast-track program.'
As a result, defendants in non-fast-track districts began arguing that this
constituted "unwarranted sentenc[ing] disparit[y]" under § 3553(a)(6)
and that they should receive a below-Guidelines sentence to account for
this disparity.3 0 Although district courts varied widely in their opinion
as to whether downward variances to account for fast-track disparity
were reasonable,3 1 circuit courts severely limited the likelihood that
downward variances based on fast-track disparity will be affirmed.
a. The Circuits Are Closing the Door on Departures
Based on Fast-Track Disparity
There is a uniform consensus among the circuits that a district court
judge's failure to provide a downward variance based on fast-track
disparity is not unreasonable, although the underlying rationale for this
conclusion varies. For example, the Tenth Circuit's decision in this
regard was predicated on the fact that "unwarranted sentencing
disparit[y]" was only one of the many factors a judge was to consider
under § 3553(a), thereby leaving it unresolved whether fast-track
disparity could be a proper ground for variance in a particular case."'
Other circuits, such as the First and Eighth, based their determination
on Congress's approval of fast-track programs in the PROTECT Act,
strongly questioning, though leaving unresolved, whether it Would ever
be reasonable to depart on the basis of fast-track disparity. 13 The
309. See, e.g., United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960, 963 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (demonstrating that Galvez-Barrios's Guidelines sentence would have been forty-one
to fifty-one months long, but if he had been prosecuted in a fast-track district, his sentence
could have been as low as twenty-seven months); United States v. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp.
2d 1255, 1259 (D. Utah 2005) (demonstrating that the defendant's Guidelines sentencing
range was eighteen to twenty-four months, but his sentence under a fast-track program would
have been ten to sixteen months).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266, 1267 (10th Cir. 2006).
311. This subject was discussed on many legal blogs. See, e.g., Sentencing Law and
Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2005/03/eighth-circuit_
.html (Mar. 16, 2005, 16:05 EST).
312. United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2005).
313. See United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
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circuits that went the furthest in completely closing the door on fast-
track disparity as an appropriate consideration are those that declared
that fast-track disparity was not unwarranted sentencing disparity,
thereby removing the issue from consideration under § 3553(a)(6) . 1
These holdings, that a within-Guidelines sentence is not per se
unreasonable, have recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court's
decision in Rita v. United States, where the Court held that appellate
courts may deem within-Guidelines sentences presumptively
reasonable.315
While every circuit has held that it is reasonable to provide a within-
Guidelines sentence, despite fast-track disparity, only three circuits, the
Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh, have explicitly held that it is
unreasonable to provide a downward variance based on fast-track
disparity.316 The remaining circuits have not expressly ruled on the
reasonableness of downward departure based on fast-track disparity. 17
As will be discussed in the next Part, the Supreme Court's decision in
Kimbrough regarding crack-powder sentencing disparity will
presumably have an impact going forward on how circuit courts evaluate
the reasonableness of non-Guidelines sentences to account for fast-track
disparity.318 Prior to Kimbrough however, while the door on providing
variances based on fast-track disparity appeared to be closing, the Sixth
Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22, 27-28, 30 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Jim6nez-
Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2006).
315. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). Rita states, however, that this presumption is only to
apply "in the mine run of cases," leaving the question of whether the disparities addressed in
this Article in fast-track, crack-powder, and Native American cases are, in fact, part of the
"mine run of cases." Id. at 2458.
316. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d at 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2006); Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d at 243-
44 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2006).
317. District courts, however, have not rushed to take advantage of the downward
departure window left open by some circuits. A 2006 report by the Sentencing Commission
showed that of the four non-fast-track districts that have sentenced more than one hundred
immigration cases post-Booker, three of them had rates of non-government sponsored,
below-Guidelines range sentences lower than the overall national average of 9.3%. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 141-42. The four districts were
the District of Utah (204 cases), the Northern District of Texas (172 cases), the Middle
District of Florida (162 cases), and the Southern District of New York (106 cases). Id. The
rate for the District of Utah was 6.9%, the Northern District of Texas was 1.7%, and the
Middle District of Florida was 7.4%. Id. at 142.
318. See infra Part V.B.; United States v. Liriano-Blanco, 510 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir.
2007) (acknowledging that while it is not per se unreasonable for a district court judge to not
correct for fast-track disparity, it remained an open question whether a judge could
appropriately consider such disparity).
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Circuit decided a case in 2006 affirming the use of fast-track disparity as
a ground for a non-Guidelines sentence.
b. Ossa-Gallegos-A Blueprint for Reasonable Variances
Based on Fast- Track Disparity
On June 30, 2006, a Sixth Circuit panel became the first circuit court
to affirm a non-Guidelines sentence based in part upon fast-track
disparity."9 In Ossa-Gallegos, the defendant pled guilty in 1996 to
sexual assault and was deported to Mexico.320 He unlawfully returned to
the United States in 1999, was arrested, and was charged with illegal
reentry.321 The district court calculated a Guidelines sentence of forty-
one to fifty-one months based upon a sixteen-offense-level addition for
having committed a "crime of violence," and then, the court reduced the
sentence by two levels based on fast-track disparity and the
"aberrational nature" of the defendant's prior crime compared to his
conduct since returning to the United States, bringing the sentence to
thirty-three months. 322  The defendant appealed, arguing that "the
district court's sixteen-level enhancement violated his Sixth
Amendment" right to a jury trial and that his sentence was
unreasonable, in part, because the two-level reduction did not fully
account for what his sentence would have been in a fast-track district.
313
The Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant's Sixth Amendment claim and
turned to the sentence's reasonableness.32 '
With respect to the fast-track issue, Ossa-Gallegos argued that the
two-level reduction did not fully eliminate the fast-track disparity.32
319. United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 453 F.3d 371, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2006), on rehearing
en banc at United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (rehearing the issue of
whether sentencing statutes permitted a tolling period for supervisory release as it applies to
those to be deported and not addressing the court's decision on a non-Guidelines sentence on
account of fast-track disparity). This decision stands, despite the fact that just three days after
this decision was issued, a separate Sixth Circuit panel reasoned that "[fast-track] disparity
does not run counter to § 3553(a)'s instruction to avoid unnecessary sentencing disparities."
United States v. Hernandez-Fierros, 453 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2006). Although the Sixth
Circuit itself has not resolved this tension, at least one district court found the latter panel's
arguments convincing and held that "fast track disparity is not an unwarranted disparity
under § 3553(a)(6)." United States v. Carballo-Arguelles, 446 F. Supp. 2d 742, 744 (E.D.
Mich. 2006).
320. Ossa-Gallegos, 453 F.3d at 372-73.
321. Id. at 373.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 373-74.
324. Id. at 374.
325. Id. The defendant presented evidence to the court to show that in three fast-track
[91:723
NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING DISPARITY
326The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the sentence.
The court stated that "[a]lthough the district court did not entirely
eliminate the disparity between Ossa-Gallegos's sentence and the
sentences of defendants with similar criminal histories in fast-track
jurisdictions, its two-level downward departure was intended to reduce
this disparity. 327 The circuit court then defended the district court's
decision to not fully eliminate the disparity, noting the following: (1)
that defendants receiving true fast-track sentences must give up their
right to challenge their conviction-something Ossa-Gallegos did not
have to do; and (2) that "'Congress seems to have endorsed at least
some degree of disparity by expressly authorizing larger downward
departures for defendants in "fast track" districts. ' ' 3 8 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that "avoiding nationwide disparities in sentencing is
only one factor to be considered under § 3553(a).,31 9 Finding that the
district court had considered several other factors, the appellate court
held that the two-level reduction was reasonable.330
This reasoning set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Ossa-Gallegos
provides a model for judges concerned about fast-track disparity that is
similarly transferable to the Native American context. While the
Supreme Court's Kimbrough decision in December 2007, regarding
crack-powder sentencing disparity, provides a more authoritative basis
for crafting non-Guidelines sentences for Native Americans, as will be
discussed, the factors considered by the Sixth Circuit in Ossa-Gallegos
are still relevant.
B. Crack-Powder Sentencing Disparity and Kimbrough
The disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences is an
issue that, perhaps even more so than fast-track sentencing disparity, has
been explored post-Booker.3 ' The disparity results from the fact that
Congress and the Guidelines implement a 100:1 sentencing ratio
districts, the average sentence for defendants with five prior convictions and two prior
deportations was thirty-two months. Id. at 375.
326. Id. at 375-76.
327. Id. at 375.
328. Id. (quoting United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379-80 (4th Cir. 2006)).
329. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2006)).
330. Id. at 375-76.
331. A search of United States law review articles through LexisNexis reveals that, in
the past two years, at least ten articles have been published that address crack-powder
sentencing disparity as a central part of the article (searched SUMMARY(crack /s (cocaine or
powder) /s disparity) and date(geq (02/26/2006))).
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between powder cocaine and crack cocaine, whereby those convicted of
dealing crack cocaine are to receive the same sentence as those
convicted of dealing one hundred times more powder cocaine."' Post-
Booker, only two circuits had held that it was permissible for district
court judges to consider this disparity at sentencing,333 but the Supreme
Court, in December 2007, decided Kimbrough, holding that a district
court judge may consider this disparity as part of its determination that
"in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is 'greater than
necessary' to serve the objectives of sentencing.'334 This Section will
provide a brief overview of the crack-powder disparity and will then
proceed to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Kimbrough.
1. Crack-Powder Sentencing Overview
The 100:1 ratio between powder cocaine and crack cocaine came
into existence in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (1986 Anti-Drug
Act).335  Congress, motivated by a concern that crack was more
dangerous than powder cocaine,336 implemented this ratio, whereby the
332. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007); Steven L. Chanenson,
Booker on Crack: Sentencing's Latest Gordian Knot, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 552
(2006). Other articles providing a summary of the crack-powder sentencing disparity issue
include: Jacob Loshin, Beyond the Clash of Disparities: Cocaine Sentencing After Booker, 29
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 619 (2007), and Eric Citron, Comment, United States v. Pho: Reasons
and Reasonableness in Post-Booker Appellate Review, 115 YALE L.J. 2183 (2006).
333. As described in Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566 n.4, the D.C. and Third Circuits had
held that this disparity could be considered at sentencing. United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d
1347, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2006).
The other circuits rejected the consideration of this disparity. See United States v.
Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d
790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir.
2007); United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 361 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams,
456 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275-76 (7th Cir.
2006): United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Pho, 433
F.3d 53, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2006).
334. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
335. Id. at 566-67.
336. The Court in Kimbrough listed the five reasons Congress deemed crack more
dangerous:
(1) crack was highly addictive; (2) crack users and dealers were more
likely to be violent than users and dealers of other drugs; (3) crack was
more harmful to users than powder, particularly for children who had
been exposed by their mothers' drug use during pregnancy; (4) crack use
was especially prevalent among teenagers; and (5) crack's potency and
low cost were making it increasingly popular.
Id. at 567.
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statute's five-year mandatory minimum sentence applies to defendants
responsible for five grams of crack or five hundred grams of powder
cocaine, and the ten-year minimum applies to defendants responsible
for fifty grams of crack or five thousand grams of powder cocaine."'
The Sentencing Commission, in crafting guidelines for these offenses,
departed from its usual empirical approach of analyzing past sentences
and instead applied Congress's 100:1 ratio across the board for the full
range of crack or powder cocaine drug quantities.33" The Commission,
however, later determined that this disparity did not comport with
Congress's sentencing objectives in the 1986 Anti-Drug Act or the
SRA.33 9 In particular, the Commission found that: (1) research did not
support the assumptions regarding the degree of harm caused by the
respective drugs that were used to justify the disparity; (2) the 100:1
ratio did not, as the 1986 Anti-Drug Act intended, punish major drug
traffickers more severely, since under the ratio, "'retail crack dealers get
longer sentences than the wholesale drug distributors who supply them
the powder cocaine from which their crack is produced"'; 340 and (3) the
discrepancy between the sentences created a lack of faith in the criminal
justice system due to the perception the ratio created "'unwarranted
disparity based on race.' 341 Based on these concerns, the Commission
has made various attempts to reduce the crack-powder ratio. In 1995,
the Commission proposed a 1:1 ratio, which Congress rejected, while at
the same time, directing the Commission to propose a revision to the
crack-powder ratio under the statutes and Guidelines. 2  The
Commission followed this directive, recommending a 5:1 ratio in 1997
and "at least" a 20:1 ratio in 2002."4 Congress, however, did not act on
either of these proposals.4 The Commission issued another report in
2007, again urging Congress to amend the 1986 Anti-Drug Act, but this
time also independently changing the Guidelines by reducing the base
offense level for quantities of crack such that sentences for crack were
337. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), (b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000)).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 568.
340. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 159 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
crack/exec.htm).
341. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 103 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02
crack/2002crackrpt.pdf).





"between two and five times longer" than those for equal quantities of
powder cocaine." It is against this framework that the Supreme Court,
in Kimbrough, addressed whether it was reasonable for district court
judges to consider the crack-powder disparity in sentencing.
2. Kimbrough-Permitting District Court Judges to Consider the
Crack-Powder Ratio at Sentencing
Despite the fact that most circuits to have addressed the crack-
powder disparity held that this was not a valid sentencing consideration
for district courts, the Supreme Court in Kimbrough held the opposite-
that judges may consider the disparity under the Guidelines as part of
their consideration as to whether a within-Guidelines sentence in a
particular case is "'greater than necessary' to serve the objectives of
sentencing.""" The Court's reasoning behind its decision strongly
indicates that sentencing disparity in the Native American context can
also be considered by district court judges.
The Court's analysis in Kimbrough proceeded in three parts. First,
the Court addressed the Government's arguments that Congress
mandated that courts respect the ratio in all circumstances."' Second,
the Court discussed the validity of a district court judge finding that a
within-Guidelines sentence failed to reflect the sentencing
considerations under § 3553(a). 348 Finally, the Court then articulated the
reasons why the sentence given in this particular case was reasonable.49
A discussion of each of these issues reveals why Native American
sentencing disparity should also be deemed a permissible consideration
for sentencing courts.
a. Congress's Directive to Apply the 100:1 Ratio
The Government focused its argument in Kimbrough on the
contention that the 100:1 ratio represented a "'specific policy
determinatio[n] that Congress has directed sentencing courts to
observe, ''3 50 thus making it "an exception to the 'general freedom that
sentencing courts have to apply the [§ 3553(a)] factors.' 351' The Court
345. Id.
346. Id. at 564 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
347. Id. at 570-72.
348. Id. at 574-75.
349. Id. at 575-76.
350. Id. at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at 25,
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) (No. 06-6330)).
351. Id. at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, 25,
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rejected all three of the arguments raised by the Government in this
vein.
The Government first argued that although the 1986 Anti-Drug Act
"'did not expressly direct the Sentencing Commission to incorporate the
100:1 ratio in the Guidelines,"' such a directive was implicit in the
statute, since to do otherwise "would be 'logically incoherent"' in light
of the mandatory minimum sentences premised on the 100:1 ratio.352
The Supreme Court easily dismissed this argument, emphasizing that
the plain terms of the statute only set minimum and maximum
sentences. The Court stated, "The statute says nothing about the
appropriate sentences within these brackets, and we decline to read any
implicit directive into that congressional silence.
313
The second argument made by the Government was that Congress,
in rejecting the Commission's 1995 proposal of a 1:1 sentencing ratio,
revealed its understanding that the 1986 Anti-Drug Act required the
Commission, and correspondingly, sentencing courts, to respect the
100:1 ratio.35 ' The Court also dismissed this argument, noting that
Congress's rejection of a 1:1 ratio did not etch into stone application of
the 100:1 ratio for all sentences.355 To support this argument, the Court
noted that the Guidelines, as amended by the Commission in 2007, did
not strictly adhere to a 100:1 ratio, yet Congress had not acted to
disapprove these amendments.3 6
The Government's third argument was premised on § 3553(a)(6)'s
requirement that district courts consider "'the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities.' 35 7 First, the Government argued
that permitting district courts to "deviat[e] from the [100:1] ratio could
result in sentencing 'cliffs' around [the drug] quantities that trigger the
mandatory minimum[]" sentences.358  The Court dismissed this
argument, noting that the Court had found a similar claim unpersuasive
in an earlier sentencing decision.359 The Government also contended
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330)).
352. Id. at 571 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at 33,
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330)).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 572.
355. Id. at 572-73.
356. Id. at 573.
357. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
358. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 33, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-
6330)).
359. Id. (discussing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996)).
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that if district courts were permitted to offer non-Guidelines sentences
based upon their opinion of the crack-powder disparity, "'defendants
with identical real conduct will receive markedly different sentences,
depending on nothing more than the particular judge drawn for
sentencing."'3 6 The Court was similarly dismissive of this argument,
noting that although "uniformity remains an important goal of
sentencing[,] ... our opinion in Booker recognized that some departures
from uniformity were a necessary cost of the remedy we adopted., 361
The Court further noted that such disparities were limited to the extent
that Congress had set mandatory minimum sentences.362 Finally, the
Court observed that any concern about unwarranted sentencing
disparities under § 3553(a)(6) did not weigh in favor of making the
crack-powder ratio mandatory, but rather, that under the terms of
§ 3553(a)(6), district courts are the body directed to consider the issue of
disparity.3
63
b. Deviating from the Guidelines
Having found that Congress had not imposed a per se bar on district
courts considering the crack-powder disparity at sentencing, the
question still remained under what circumstances, given that "district
courts must treat the Guidelines as the 'starting point and the initial
benchmark,"' it would be appropriate for a district court to deviate from
a within-Guidelines sentence.3'6  The Court rearticulated that the
Guidelines' value was in "'reflect[ing] a rough approximation of
sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives,' ' 36 while a district
court judge's familiarity with the particular case before him places the
judge "'in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under
§ 3553(a)' in each particular case."" Based upon this respective
expertise, the Court stated that a variance from the Guidelines merited
the "greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case
'outside the "heartland""' of cases to which the Guidelines were
intended to apply.367 In contrast, despite the advisory nature of the
360. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 40, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-
6330)).
361. Id. at 573-74.
362. Id. at 574.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 574-75 (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007)).
365. Id. at 574 (quoting Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
366. Id. (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597).
367. Id. at 574-75 (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465).
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Guidelines, "closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge
varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's view that the
Guidelines range 'fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations' even
in a mine-run case.
368
With these principles in mind, the Court reasoned that, with respect
to crack-cocaine disparity, a district court judge would be acting within
his authority in determining that the 100:1 disparity "yields a sentence
'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in a mine-
run case." 369  This was premised on the fact that the Sentencing
Commission, in simply adopting the ratio established by Congress, had
not acted in accord with its institutional expertise of looking to national
sentencing statistics. °  Moreover, the Court observed that the
Commission itself had noted that the crack-powder ratio resulted in
sentences that did not meet the sentencing purposes in § 3553(a).37'
c. Crafting a Reasonable Sentence
After determining that it is not per se unreasonable for a district
court to consider the disparity under the crack-powder ratio at
sentencing, the Court finally addressed whether the district court's
consideration of this disparity in the particular case at hand was
appropriate.372  Here, the Court found the sentence reasonable,
discussing in the process the proper manner for district court judges to
proceed at sentencing.373
The Court began by stating that the district court first properly
calculated and considered the Guidelines sentencing range.374 Then, the
district court looked to "'the nature and circumstances"' of the crime
and the defendant's "'history and characteristics.' ' 37 The Court then
went on to address the district court's consideration of the crack-powder
disparity. First, the district court, per § 3553(a)(5), referenced the
Sentencing Commission's reports criticizing the disparity.376 Next, the
district court compared the Guidelines sentence for the defendant to the
corresponding sentence for a comparable amount of powder, suggesting




372. Id. at 575-76.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 575.




that the resulting disparity was unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6).37
Importantly, the Court emphasized that the district court did not make a
policy determination as to what an appropriate crack-powder ratio
would be.378 Instead, the district court "appropriately framed its final
determination in line with § 3553(a)'s overarching instruction to 'impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to accomplish the
sentencing goals advanced in § 3553(a)(2)., 379
The Court thus found that the district court based its sentence on
proper considerations and "'committed no procedural error. ' ''38°
Turning then to the overarching question of whether the sentence was
reasonable, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in giving this non-Guidelines sentence, concluding that "the
District Court properly homed in on the particular circumstances of
Kimbrough's case and accorded weight to the Sentencing Commission's
consistent and emphatic position that the crack-powder disparity is at
odds with § 3553(a)., 38' Accordingly, the Court concluded that "a
reviewing court could not rationally conclude that the 4.5-year sentence
reduction Kimbrough received [from the district court] qualified as an
abuse of discretion.
382
VI. CORRECTING FOR NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING DISPARITY
With the Guidelines now being advisory, correcting for Native
American sentencing disparity is a prime issue to reexamine. Courts'
treatment of disparity in the fast-track and crack-powder contexts
provides a useful guide as to how judges can craft reasonable non-
Guidelines sentences to account for this disparity for Native Americans.
The limited success of non-Guidelines sentences to account for fast-
track disparity seemingly meant that, at best, a conservative approach,
tracking the reasoning in Ossa-Gallegos, of reducing rather than
eliminating such disparity, had the greatest chance of withstanding
appellate scrutiny. To the extent, however, that the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Kimbrough regarding crack-powder sentencing disparity is
similarly applicable in the Native American context, a much stronger




380. Id. at 575-76 (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007)).
381. Id. at 576.
382. Id.
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unreasonable.
This Part will use the Court's reasoning in Kimbrough as a model for
showing why courts should not be barred as a per se matter from
considering Native American sentencing disparity, and then proceed to
look at how judges are to appropriately consider such disparity in a
particular case. Through this analysis, this Part will compare and
contrast the nature of the disparity in the Native American context with
that surrounding the fast-track and crack-powder issues. With respect
to whether district courts are permitted to consider Native American
sentencing disparity, this Part will first examine why Congress has not
barred courts from accounting for this disparity and will then explore
why courts may depart from the Sentencing Commission and the
Guidelines in this context. Once it is shown that judges may account for
such disparity at sentencing, this Part will then look to the template
provided in Kimbrough to show how judges may consider this disparity
so as to craft reasonable non-Guidelines sentences for Native American
defendants that will withstand appellate review.
A. District Court Judges Are Not Barred from Accounting
for Native American Sentencing Disparity
The first issue to confront is whether district court judges are barred
from considering Native American sentencing disparity at sentencing.
Although in both the fast-track and crack-powder contexts, it is clear
that district court judges are not required to correct for such disparity,383
particularly in light of Kimbrough, it is also clear that such disparity may
be a valid consideration. This is because, as in Kimbrough, Congress
has not barred courts from taking such disparity into account, and the
Sentencing Commission has acknowledged the unique nature of such
sentences compared to other sentencing recommendations under the
Guidelines.
1. Congress Has Not Required District Courts to Enforce Any Federal-
State Sentencing Disparity for Native American Defendants
In Kimbrough, the Government's main argument against courts
deviating from the 100:1 crack-powder ratio was that Congress had, at
least implicitly, mandated that courts apply this ratio at sentencing. In
the fast-track context, courts often rested on similar arguments, with
383. See supra Part V.A.2.a. (fast-track); supra Part V.B.2 (crack-powder).
384. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570-71.
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more than one court noting that Congress's statutory directive that a
departure for fast-track sentencing be promulgated in the Guidelines
amounted to a Congressional endorsement of any resulting sentencing
disparity.38' For the same reasons discussed in Kimbrough,31 however,
such arguments do not carry weight in the context of Native American
sentencing disparity. Furthermore, any seeming congressional
endorsement of such disparity is much more explicit in the fast-track
context than exists with respect to Native American sentencing. As an
additional matter, any concerns that Native American sentencing
disparity cannot be deemed "unwarranted" are also unavailing in light
of Kimbrough's reasoning, as well as the unique nature of the federal-
state disparity in the Native American context.
a. Congress Has Only Bound Courts Through Statutory
Minimum and Maximum Sentences
The first argument raised by the Government in Kimbrough, that
the 100:1 ratio established in the mandatory minimum sentences must
similarly be applied across the board for all sentences above the
statutory minimum, is similarly unpersuasive in the Native American
context.3 Whether a Native American is being sentenced under federal
law for manslaughter, sexual abuse, or aggravated assault, without a
specific statutory directive to the contrary, courts are only required to
respect the mandatory sentencing minimums and maximums established
by Congress.3m This provides a natural check on judges' abilities to fully
correct for any federal-state disparity because the corresponding state
sentence may fall beneath the federal statutory minimum3 but it does
not prevent judges from using their discretion to sentence Native
American defendants within the congressionally established minimums
and maximums.
b. There Is No Implicit Congressional Mandate That Courts Adhere to
Any Native American Sentencing Disparity
The Court, in Kimbrough, dismissed the Government's argument
that Congress, in rejecting the Commission's proposed 1:1 crack-powder
385. See supra Part V.A.2.a.; see also supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
386. See supra Part V.B.2.
387. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570-72; see also supra notes 352-53 and accompanying
text.
388. See id. at 571.
389. Id. at 574 ("[P]ossible variations among district courts are constrained by the
mandatory minimums Congress prescribed in the 1986 Act.").
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ratio, signaled its intention that courts be bound to the 100:1 ratio in
sentencing?.9 In contrast, in the fast-track context, courts have placed
considerable weight on Congress's implicit endorsement of some
resulting disparity in the PROTECT Act.3 91 Indeed, even the one
appellate court to affirm a non-Guidelines sentence due to fast-track
disparity noted that this congressional endorsement weighed in favor of
reducing, rather than fully eliminating, any such disparity.392 As was the
case in Kimbrough, any congressional action with respect to Native
American sentencing similarly falls short of serving as a congressional
mandate that such disparity be left untouched.393 Furthermore, any
seeming endorsement on Congress's behalf of such disparity does not
rise to the level of Congress's endorsement of the fast-track disparity in
the PROTECT Act. 4
Prior congressional actions to account for Native American disparity
in the criminal justice system have focused on uniformity among federal
defendants rather than on federal-state disparity for Native American
defendants. These congressional actions, however, do not necessarily
mean that Congress has endorsed Native American sentencing disparity
stemming from the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In
1976, for example, Congress acted to eliminate disparity between
Indians prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act and non-Indians
prosecuted under the General Crimes Act for the same offense after
two circuit courts found such disparity unconstitutional.9  Congress's
action in that circumstance to foster uniformity among federal
defendants, however, can be understood as Congress's needed response
to correct what courts had deemed to be unconstitutional disparity.3 96 In
contrast, as the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Antelope3"
illustrates, disparity between state and federal defendants does not rise
to constitutional proportions and therefore does not necessitate
congressional action.398  Just as in Kimbrough, where the Court was
unwilling to interpret Congress's rejection of the Commission's
390. Id. at 572-73; supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
391. See supra Part V.A.2.a.
392. See United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 453 F.3d 371, 374-76 (6th Cir. 2006); see also
supra Part V.A.2.b.
393. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 572-73; see also supra notes 355-56 and accompanying
text.
394. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
395. H.R. REP. No. 94-1038, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1125.
396. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
397. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
398. See supra Part III.B.l.c.
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proposed 1:1 crack-powder ratio as representing a codification of the
100:1 ratio's application across the board,3 similarly, Congress's
reluctance to act when Native American sentencing disparity does not
reach constitutional proportions does not mean that such disparity is
deemed mandated by Congress or warranted for purposes of
§ 3553(a)(6).
Congress has also acted by making clear that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines apply to assimilative crimes and the Major Crimes Act.
While this amendment to the SRA reflected a congressional concern
with ensuring the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in all
federal criminal prosecutions, the amendment did not serve to bar
district courts from considering any resulting Native American
sentencing disparity. First, to the extent the 1990 amendment was
merely a codification of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Norquay,40'
Congress's endorsement of any resulting disparity was limited to the
narrowest possible disparity-that between federal and state defendants
both prosecuted under state substantive law.4°  More importantly,
Congress's intent that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines apply to
federal prosecutions for crimes occurring in Indian country403 does not
signal a clear endorsement on Congress's part of any resulting
sentencing disparity. Even understanding at the time the amendment
was passed that the Guidelines were effectively mandatory, downward
departures were permitted for cases falling outside the "heartland" of
cases contemplated by the Guidelines. Furthermore, post-Booker, the
Guidelines are only one of many factors district courts are to consider at
sentencing, and therefore, the Guidelines' applicability to Native
American defendants does not foreclose courts from considering any
resulting sentencing disparity under the other relevant § 3553(a) factors.
399. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 572-73 (2007); see also supra notes
354-56 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 217.
401. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1602, 104 Stat. 4789, 4843 (1990)
(codifying United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1990)); supra note 217 and
accompanying text.
402. See Norquay, 905 F.2d at 1161. The fact that Congress's intent was limited to
assimilative crimes is clear by the title of the amendment, "Amendment to Clarify
Application of Sentencing Reform Act to Assimilative Crimes." § 1602, 104 Stat. at 4843.
403. Although the 1990 amendment was directed at assimilative crimes, the plain text of
the amendment makes clear that the SRA applies to all crimes prosecuted pursuant to the
Major Crimes Act. § 1602, 104 Stat. at 4843. The Guidelines' application to federally defined
crimes prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act does not seem to have been an issue debated
in the courts.
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Congress, in fact, has shown itself to be sympathetic to Native
American defendants in circumstances where Native Americans are
disproportionately impacted by a federal offense or where gross
disparity exists between federal and state sentences. In both federal
death penalty and "three strikes and you're out" legislation, Congress
included a similar "special provision for Indian country," whereby
Native Americans subject to federal jurisdiction, due to the
jurisdictional scheme in Indian country, are not subject to either of these
punishments, unless the tribe has elected for the act to have effect.4"
Although it appears that this "special provision," at least in the Federal
Death Penalty Act, was motivated primarily by concerns regarding
tribal sovereignty, subcommittee reports regarding earlier proposals for
the death penalty statute and the "three strikes and you're out"
legislation indicate that testimony on the disparate impact this
legislation would have on Native Americans was heard by the
subcommittee. '
Like Congress's policy with respect to crack-powder sentencing,
none of Congress's actions or inactions in the Native American context
serve as a congressional bar on courts' abilities to consider Native
American sentencing disparity because Congress has not explicitly
stated that such disparity cannot be a relevant consideration at
sentencing. If, however, a court were to borrow from the fast-track
debate and examine the degree to which Congress has endorsed any
disparity,"" this would be at its lowest ebb in the Native American
context with respect to non-assimilative crimes where Native Americans
are disproportionately represented in federal court and federal-state
sentencing disparities are extreme. Based on these factors, Native
Americans convicted of aggravated assault will have particularly
compelling arguments because aggravated assault is a federally defined
offense, with Native Americans comprising nearly thirty-four percent of
those individuals in federal custody for assault"7 and receiving federal
sentences averaging up to sixty-two percent longer than corresponding
state sentences.4
There are other offenses, however, for which it appears Congress has
endorsed at least some degree of Native American sentencing disparity.
404. See supra Part III.B.2.a.ii.
405. See id.
406. See supra Part V.A.2.
407. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 31.
408. See supra Part I.
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This may be the case, for example, with respect to sex crimes against
children, despite the fact that Native Americans comprised over half of
the federal sex abuse convictions in 2001 and in some cases receive
sentences over seventy percent greater than their state counterparts.'
In recent years, Congress has taken an increasingly tough position on
sex offenders, as evidenced by the 2003 PROTECT Act and the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006."0 These statutes failed
to consider their impact on Native Americans, 1 ' although Congress also
amended the Major Crimes Act in 2006 to include jurisdiction over
"felony child abuse or neglect."41 2 Congress's clear intent in modifying
the Major Crimes Act was to combat crime against children in Indian413
country, lending support to a conclusion that Congress similarly
endorses the harsh penalties in the PROTECT and Adam Walsh Acts
for sex crimes committed by Native Americans against children, even
though Congress did not hear testimony from Native Americans before
passing those laws. Despite what might be considered congressional
endorsement of sentencing disparity, the Court's framework in
Kimbrough would not bar judges from considering such disparity.
Instead, district courts' discretion in sentencing would just be limited to
operating within the statutory minimums and maximums established by
Congress, which as the Native American Advisory Group pointed out,
are quite high with respect to sex offenses.414
409. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 21-22 & n.37.
410. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587.
411. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 23-24 (stating that the
PROTECT Act appeared to be passed "without having heard from those most impacted
[Native Americans] nor giving any thought to that impact"). Similarly, dissenters criticized a
bill in the House that largely mirrored the Adam Walsh Act and created "harsh new
mandatory minimum sentences for existing offenses under the Major Crimes Act," without
"deliberative consultation with the representatives from the group most affected by the
legislation, Native Americans." H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(I), at 256 (2005). Further searches of
the Adam Walsh Act's legislative history in Westlaw and Thomas did not indicate that such
hearings were ever held.
412. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West Supp. 2007) (amended on July 27, 2006); see also
S. REP. NO. 109-255, at 5 (2006).
413. See S. REP. NO. 109-255, at 5 ("The [Senate] Committee [on Indian Affairs] is
concerned that a whole category of crimes against children is going unaddressed. Therefore,
an amendment is added to the Major Crimes Act to criminalize acts of child abuse and
neglect in Indian Country. This amendment is intended to close the gap that exists in
addressing the full range of crimes that may be inflicted on children.").
414. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 21.
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c. Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity
i. Concerns About Sentencing "Cliffs" and Similar Defendants
Receiving Different Sentences Are Not a Bar to Correcting for
Native American Sentencing Disparity
The final argument raised by the Government in Kimbrough was
that permitting district courts to deviate from the 100:1 crack-powder
ratio would result in "unwarranted sentencing disparities" in violation of
§ 3553(a)(6).' The reasons offered by the Court to dismiss the
Government's argument similarly address concerns that permitting
district court judges to award non-Guidelines sentences to Native
Americans frustrates the goal of federal uniformity in sentencing.416
First, any concerns that consideration of Native American sentencing
disparity would result in "cliffs" around statutory minimums is
unavailing, based on the Court's express dismissal of the legitimacy of
any such concerns in Neal v. United States.417 Similarly, the argument
that permitting non-Guidelines sentences to account for Native
American sentencing disparity will result in similarly situated
defendants receiving different sentences is also unpersuasive. The
Court in Kimbrough emphasized that this is an inherent cost of the post-
Booker sentencing scheme and that under § 3553(a)(6), district courts
are the body charged with avoiding any unwarranted disparities.4 8
ii. The Underlying Nature of Native American Sentencing Disparity
While, as a general matter, the discussion in Kimbrough regarding
unwarranted sentencing disparity is similarly applicable in the Native
American context, at the same time, the underlying nature of the
disparity is different with respect to the crack-powder and Native
American issues. To some degree, the underlying cause of the disparity
for Native Americans is more akin to fast-track disparity because both
are linked by a common concern about the "equality of justice when
sentences vary for people based on where they are sentenced., 41 9 A key
415. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573 (2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
416. Id. at 573-74.
417. Id. at 573 (citing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996)).
418. Id. at 574.
419. United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 453 F.3d 371, 373 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting the
district court). With respect to fast-track programs, the majority of these programs exist in
Southwest border districts. As a result, illegal immigrants caught reentering the United States
immediately upon crossing the border are able to take advantage of fast-track programs and
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difference exists, however, between Native American sentencing
disparity and both fast-track and crack-powder disparities in that, for
Native Americans, the disparity is between federal and state sentences,
while in the other two circumstances, the disparity is between federal
defendants. Although on its face § 3553(a)(6) appears to permit judges
to consider disparity between federal defendants, as well as that
between federal and state defendants in sentencing,42' circuit courts,
both pre-Booker' and post-Booker,22 have been nearly unanimous in
holding that only a disparity between similarly situated federal
defendants could be considered under § 3553(a)(6). This determination
was largely premised on the notion that the purpose of the Guidelines,
to "'promot[e] uniformity among federal courts when imposing
lighter sentences, while defendants that travel farther away from the border, usually to
reunite with family, are slapped with much stiffer penalties. See McClellan & Sands, supra
note 300, at 523-25. As for Native Americans, "major crimes" committed by Native
Americans within Indian country are prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes
Act, while the same crimes committed by Native Americans outside Indian country are under
state jurisdiction and prosecuted under state substantive law in state court. See supra Part
II.A.5. Although geography is the critical factor creating disparity in both cases, fast-track
disparity occurs at more of a national level, while Native American sentencing disparity tends
to be more local in nature. Federal districts are relatively large in size, with many, like the
District of Arizona, encompassing the entire state. As a result, while a district's
implementation of a fast-track program may vary district-by-district in the Southwest, for the
most part, there is a large, contiguous bloc of the United States where fast-track programs are
in place, and a much larger, contiguous bloc of the United States where fast-track programs
do not exist. This is not the case for Indian country. With the exception of large reservations
like the Navajo Nation, many reservations are relatively small in size and the borders can be
relatively arbitrary in nature. See Nationalatlas.gov, South Dakota, Federal Lands and Indian
Reservations, http://img.search.com/7n2/300px-National-atlas-indian-reservations-south-
dakota.gif (last visited April 12, 2008) (showing the reservation borders in South Dakota). As
a result, sentencing disparities can exist between local Native American residents, while for
the fast-track issue, the disparity exists at a regional level. See supra Part II.C.
420. See Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the
Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REv. 721, 724
(2002).
421. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 40, at 516 n.158.
422. Post-Booker, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have gone the furthest in expressly
barring district courts from considering state sentences as a factor in federal sentencing.
United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 486 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is impermissible for a district
court to consider the defendant's likely state court sentence as a factor in determining his
federal sentence."); United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The
District Court was neither required nor permitted under § 3553(a)(6) to consider a potential
federal-state sentencing disparity."). The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
all gone at least so far as to say that a district court judge is not required to consider federal-
state sentencing disparity. United States v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2007); United
States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d
1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 687-88 (4th Cir. 2006).
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sentences for federal crimes,"' would be undermined if federal sentences
were then altered to account for federal-state disparity.4 23 This general
bar on consideration of federal-state disparity under § 3553(a)(6),
however, should not apply with respect to Native American sentencing
disparity.
(a) Considering Federal-State Disparity in the Native American Context
Does Not Question Prosecutorial Discretion
In addition to a broad concern about uniformity among federal
sentences, one of the main reasons courts have been resistant to
permitting consideration of federal-state disparity in federal sentencing
is the concern that this conflicts with prosecutorial discretion. For
example, the First Circuit, in Snyder, rejected federal-state disparity as a
valid consideration under § 3553(a)(6), based upon the notion that
doing so would "'impinge impermissibly upon the Executive Branch's
discretion to prosecute defendants under federal law."'4 2'  Although
Native American sentencing disparity is the result of federal-state
disparity, the issue does not raise the same concerns regarding
impingement upon the Executive Branch's discretion cited by Snyder.
The situation in Snyder, and nearly all challenges to federal-state
disparity that do not involve Native American defendants, is that
charges can be brought against the defendant in either state or federal
court.4 25  The court in Snyder ruled that, in such situations, it was
inappropriate for a court to question a federal prosecutor's decision to
prosecute rather than leaving the matter to state authorities.4 26 These
concerns do not arise with respect to Native American prosecution
under the Major Crimes Act. When a Native American commits a
major crime in Indian country, he is only subject to federal
prosecution. '  Therefore, if a court were to consider federal-state
sentencing disparity in its sentencing of a Native American under the
423. O'Hear, supra note 420, at 738 (quoting United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 69
(1st Cir. 1998)). In Snyder, the court also reasoned that the Commission had sufficient
knowledge of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, and that such departures would
"impinge impermissibly upon the Executive Branch's discretion to prosecute defendants
under federal law." Snyder, 136 F.3d at 70 (citation omitted).
424. Snyder, 136 F.3d at 70.
425. See Snyder, 136 F.3d at 66 (showing that Massachusetts authorities initially charged
Snyder with unlawfully carrying a firearm but dropped the charge when a federal grand jury
indicted Snyder).
426. See id. at 70.
427. Although tribes exercise concurrent jurisdiction, they are subject to the limitations
of the Indian Civil Rights Act. See supra Part II.A.5.
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Major Crimes Act, the court would not be calling into question the
United States Attorney's decision to prosecute the defendant rather
than leave the matter to state authorities. This fact sets Native
American sentencing disparity apart from other cases of federal-state
sentencing disparity by avoiding the concern that correcting for such
disparity tramples upon prosecutorial discretion.
(b) It Is Appropriate to Single out Native Americans
for "Particular and Special Treatment"
It is also appropriate for district courts to consider federal-state
sentencing disparity for Native Americans under § 3553(a)(6) because
of Indian tribes' "unique legal status ...under federal law." 429  The
Constitution vests Congress with the authority to "single[] Indians out as
a proper subject for separate legislation, ' 3 with treaties and the
"guardian-ward" relationship also permitting Congress to legislate on
federally recognized tribes' behalf. '31  Because of this unique
relationship, the Supreme Court, "[o]n numerous occasions
specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular
and special treatment., 43 In contrast to cases involving illegal aliens, as
428. See DeMaso, supra note 4, at 2121-22. In this note, DeMaso contends that federal
courts should consider federal-state disparity at sentencing, unless "the prosecution can offer
legitimate reasons why the disparity in this case should not be considered, or if there is a
uniquely federal injury that must be vindicated, or when the state courts cannot adequately
prosecute." Id. at 2125 (footnote omitted). With respect to these issues, disparity should be
considered when sentencing Native Americans because crimes under the Major Crimes Act
are not uniquely federal crimes, and instead typically fall under the state's police powers; the
injury is not a unique federal injury, rather, federal jurisdiction is a product of the crime
occurring in Indian country and the defendant being Indian. Although the state courts
cannot adequately prosecute the Indian defendant, states are adequately able to prosecute
the offenses in the Major Crimes Act, and indeed do so in cases involving a non-Indian
defendant and non-Indian victim in Indian country. Therefore, under this framework, courts
should be permitted to consider federal-state disparity when sentencing Native American
defendants.
429. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
430. Id. at 552 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which gives Congress authority to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes.).
431. Id. at 551.
432. Id. at 554-55 (citing Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943) (federally
granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, (1973)
(federally granted tax immunity); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 384 U.S. 209 (1966), affg 244
F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965) (statutory definition of tribal membership, with resulting
interest in trust estate); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, (1959) (tribal courts and their
jurisdiction over reservation affairs); cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 228-29 (1974) (federal
welfare benefits for Indians "on or near" reservations)). In Morton, the Court relied upon
this unique relationship as the basis for upholding an employment preference in the Bureau
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is the case with fast-track disparity, where the question is whether such
aliens are entitled to the same rights and protections as other United
States' citizens,433 cases involving Native Americans' unique legal status
have generally concerned whether Native Americans are entitled to
special rights and protections beyond those provided to other citizens .
Therefore, while Congress's ability to single out Native Americans is
used as a justification for the unique criminal jurisdiction arrangement
over Indian country, 435 Native Americans' "unique legal status" also
provides an additional basis for considering federal-state sentencing
disparity with respect to Native American defendants.436
Tempering to some degree, however, the argument that such
disparity should be considered due to Native Americans' "unique legal
status" is the notion that Native American defendants must take the
bitter with the sweet. Tribal sovereignty is a fundamental issue for
Native American tribes, and the current criminal jurisdiction
arrangement over Indian country is the result of tribes' status as
"domestic dependent nations," whereby tribes are under the trust of the
United States, but not subject to state laws.437  Therefore, the federal
government's exclusive criminal jurisdiction over major crimes
committed by Native Americans in Indian country is a product of the
United States' recognition of tribal sovereignty. It is important to
of Indian Affairs for hiring Indians in the face of a challenge under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972. See Morton, 415 U.S. at 199, 238.
433. Although illegal aliens are "persons" entitled to due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (citing Shaughnessy v.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)), they are not a "suspect class" for equal protection purposes,
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 219 n.19, and the Supreme Court has noted that "[p]ersuasive arguments
support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence
within the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct," id. at 219. Based on
this categorization, cases concerning illegal aliens' rights often occur in the context of whether
illegal aliens are to be afforded the same rights and privileges as other United States citizens.
See, e.g., Plyer, 457 U.S. at 210-11 (finding a Texas statute restricting educational access and
funding for children of illegal aliens as violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
434. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554-55, the Supreme Court discussed how "[o]n
numerous occasions this Court specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for
particular and special treatment." See supra note 432.
435. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1977).
436. It should be noted that past statements by the Supreme Court affirming Indian
tribes' "unique legal status . . . under federal law" have been limited to upholding the
permissibility of federal regulations and legislation "aimed solely at tribal Indians." Id. at 649
n.11 (emphasis omitted). As a result, it appears to be a somewhat open question as to
whether a court, on its own, could "single[] out Indians for particular and special treatment."
See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554-55.
437. See supra Part II.A.
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remember that due to Public Law 280, six states possess full criminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed by Native Americans in Indian
country."' In those states, Native Americans do not suffer any of the
disparities discussed in this Article and they are instead subject to the
same state sentences as any other defendant. Congress amended Public
Law 280 to include a tribal consent clause, whereby states could assume
Public Law 280 jurisdiction with tribal consent."9 Although the federal
government would maintain concurrent criminal jurisdiction in these
"optional" states," if tribes were overwhelmingly concerned with the
federal-state sentencing disparity experienced by Native Americans
under the Major Crimes Act, tribes could submit to concurrent state
criminal jurisdiction. Tellingly, Public Law 280's expansion has been
"largely halted" since tribal consent has been required." This can
largely be attributed to tribal resistance towards submitting to state
jurisdiction," likely coupled with tribal reluctance to cease operation of
its own tribal criminal justice system."3
Therefore, while Native Americans convicted under the Major
Crimes Act are generally subject to harsher sentences than similar
defendants sentenced in state court, tribes have the option to reduce this
disparity by submitting themselves to concurrent state criminal
jurisdiction under Public Law 280. While it is unsurprising that tribes
are unwilling to voluntarily surrender their sovereignty on this front, an
argument can be made that Native Americans must then take the bitter
with the sweet-in this case, higher sentences for violations of federal,
rather than state, law. This does not mean that it becomes per se
unreasonable for a judge to reduce such disparity in sentencing a Native
American defendant. A similar issue, for example, has arisen in fast-
track districts, where in order for defendants to qualify for a downward
departure under the fast-track program, they must give up their right to
challenge their conviction, something which the defendant in Ossa-
438. See Supra Part II.A.3.
439. CANBY, supra note 26, at 253 (citing 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a)).
440. Id. at 236. Concurrent federal and state jurisdiction is unique to the optional states.
In the mandatory states, criminal jurisdiction is exclusively with the states. See id.
441. Id. at 253. The only state to obtain such consent was Utah, but Utah bound itself to
retrocede Public Law 280 jurisdiction whenever requested by a tribe. Id. (citing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-36-15 (renumbered as UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-9-207 (2007))).
442. Id. at 233.
443. See id. at 237. Although tribes may maintain their inherent criminal jurisdiction
even when subject to Public Law 280, the practical effect of Public Law 280 is the end of tribal
criminal jurisdiction, whether due to a lack of need or a lack of resources to maintain a
separate criminal justice system. Id.
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Gallegos did not have to do as part of his plea agreement. In that case,
the Sixth Circuit determined that since Ossa-Gallegos was not "similarly
situated" to those defendants pleading under a fast-track program, it
was reasonable for the district court not to fully eliminate the sentencing
disparity."4 Similarly, this bitter with the sweet argument presents a
reason why it may be reasonable for district courts to reduce, rather
than fully eliminate, Native American sentencing disparity.
(c) The Courts Are the Proper Body to Address Native
American Sentencing Disparity
An additional reason for permitting judges to account for Native
American sentencing disparity is that the Judiciary is the branch of
government best suited to address this issue. As the Court stated in
Kimbrough, "Section 3553(a)(6) directs district courts to consider the
need to avoid unwarranted disparities," including any potential
disparities caused by deviation from a strict adherence to the crack-
powder ratio."5 Thus, similar concerns that non-Guidelines sentences
for particular Native Americans would cause disparity among federal
defendants is an issue for district courts to resolve. Moreoever, in light
of the institutional strengths of the respective branches of government,
the Judiciary is the proper branch to address and resolve Native
American sentencing disparity. Unlike fast-track disparity, which arises
from the Attorney General's authorization of fast-track districts, Native
American disparity is the product of a quirk surrounding criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country. To the extent this disparity can be
characterized as a jurisdictional matter, courts have a special interest in
the issue and are functionally well-adapted to resolving the matter.46
Furthermore, not only does this issue fall within the Judiciary's
expertise, but the matter does not create separation of powers concerns
with the other branches. Congress properly set forth the general
jurisdictional scheme for Indian country but has not authoritatively
spoken to the resulting sentencing disparity."7  In addition, Native
American sentencing disparity is not intertwined with easing
444. United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 453 F.3d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2006).
445. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574 (2007).
446. See Shapiro, supra note 247, at 574 (arguing that "courts are functionally better
adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is the legislature" regarding the question
of whether a court must exercise jurisdiction, and that "questions of jurisdiction are of special
concern to the courts because they intimately affect the courts' relations with each other as
well as with the other branches of government").
447. See supra Part III.B.2.
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prosecutorial administrative burdens, as it is in the fast-track case, nor as
discussed, does it impinge upon prosecutorial discretion as do most
cases of federal-state sentencing disparity."
2. Deviating from the Sentencing Guidelines
In light of Kimbrough, it appears that Congress has not barred
district court judges from considering Native American sentencing
disparity. Although Congress has not put up such a bar, it is still
necessary to explore under what circumstances it would be appropriate
for a district court judge to deviate from the Guidelines when sentencing
a Native American defendant."9 This largely depends upon the degree
to which the Guidelines accurately reflect the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors in a given case.450 Therefore, if the sentencing of Native
American defendants falls "outside the 'heartland"' of cases for which
the Commission intended the Guidelines to apply, a non-Guidelines
sentence should be given more deference. 5'
The Eighth Circuit's Big Crow line of cases can largely be viewed in
the context of this "outside the heartland" analysis. As discussed
earlier, however, that line of cases, awarding downward departures
solely on the basis of a Native American defendant's ability to show
resilience in the face of the many obstacles associated with reservation
life, is in clear conflict with the SRA's requirement of neutrality with
respect to race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic
status.452 In contrast, this Article's approach, basing a non-Guidelines
sentence on the peculiarities of criminal jurisdiction over Indian
country, is also available to non-Indians and therefore does not run
afoul of the Sentencing Reform Act's ban on considering race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status.453 This is
because, while federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian country
primarily impacts Native American defendants, non-Indians prosecuted
under the General Crimes Act are subject to the same federal-state
sentencing disparity as Indians prosecuted pursuant to the Major Crimes
448. See supra Part V.A.2.; DeMaso, supra note 4, at 2121-22 (discussing, and ultimately
dismissing, criticism that judicial correction for federal-state disparity impinges upon
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion).
449. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574-75.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. See 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5H1.10; see also supra Part
III.A.3.; supra Part III.B.l.a.
453. See 2005 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7, § 5H1.10.
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Act, and as such they can argue for downward departures to correct for
this disparity."'
Similar to the circumstances in Kimbrough, it is relatively clear that
district courts could reasonably determine that a within-Guidelines
sentence for a defendant committing an offense within Indian country
"yields a sentence 'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s
purposes, even in a mine-run case.""45 This is because, as was the case
with respect to the crack-powder ratio, the Sentencing Commission has
expressly voiced concerns over the Guidelines' impact on Native
Americans. The Sentencing Commission formed the Native American
Advisory Group, charging it to "'[c]onsider any viable methods to
improve the operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in their
application to Native Americans under the Major Crimes Act.',4 56
Furthermore, the Group's formation was largely predicated upon
"testimony ... that there was a perception among members of the
Native American community that they are sentenced more harshly
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines than they would be if
prosecuted by their states. 4 57  The Group focused its attention on
manslaughter, sexual abuse, and aggravated offense-three offenses
that disproportionately affect Native Americans.
Although the Group's recommendation with respect to
manslaughter was premised on concerns regarding the prevalence of
drunk driving in Indian country and was not informed by sentencing
disparity,459 the Group candidly addressed the disparity issue with
respect to sexual abuse offenses and aggravated assault.46° With respect
to sexual abuse offenses, the Group directly acknowledged that Native
Americans were disproportionately affected by the generally longer
federal, as opposed to state, sentences for sexual abuse.46' The Group
454. The arguments to correct for this sentencing disparity for non-Indians prosecuted
pursuant to the General Crimes Act are not identical to those for Indians under the Major
Crimes Act. For example, Congress has not expressed concern for disparate sentencing for
non-Indians, and only Indians are permitted to be singled out for particularized treatment
under federal law. Some arguments do cut in favor of reducing non-Indian sentencing
disparity, namely that non-Indians cannot be criticized for needing to accept the bitter with
the sweet.
455. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
456. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 11 (alteration in original).
457. Id. at 10-11.
458. Id. at i.
459. Id. at 16-18.




further noted that the PROTECT Act, which had just been passed at
the time, only increased this disparity, would "dramatically affect Native
Americans more than other persons," and was passed without Congress
considering the law's impact on Native Americans. 62 The Group's
ultimate recommendation on this front was to separate in the Guidelines
"travel offenses" from those that primarily target Native Americans.
463
Although it was intended that this approach would "indirectly reduce
the sentencing disparity," the Group acknowledged that separating out
travel offenses would "not decrease the present disparity between
federal and state sentences. '' 464 In contrast to the approach taken for
sexual abuse offenses, the Group's recommendation with respect to
aggravated assault was aimed directly at reducing federal-state
sentencing disparity, although the Group conceded that its proposed
reduction under the Guidelines was "a conservative approach" based on
the lesser disparity observed in South Dakota as opposed to New
465Mexico.
These recommendations by the Group for sexual abuse offenses and
aggravated assault, coupled with the Sentencing Commission's partial
adoption of these recommendations, reflect an implicit
acknowledgement on the Sentencing Commission's part that the
Guidelines, when applied to Native Americans, do not reflect the
purposes of sentencing under § 3553(a). Thus, as in Kimbrough, a
district court judge, particularly with respect to these two offenses,
would not be overstepping his authority in finding that a within-
Guidelines sentence was "'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s
purposes ',4 66 when sentencing a Native American defendant. This is
particularly true since, even in cases such as aggravated assault, where
the Group recommended467 and the Commission partially adopted, a
modest sentence reduction in the Guidelines to account for sentencing
disparity, such a change in the Guidelines still fails to account for the
specific disparity that varies from state to state. Therefore, while the
Commission has acknowledged concern about Native American
sentencing disparity, because such disparity varies on a state-by-state
basis, district court judges, rather than the Commission operating at a
462. Id. at 23-24.
463. Id. at 25-26.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 33-34.
466. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007).
467. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 33-34.
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national level, are best equipped to address this issue. As a result, just
as with the crack-powder ratio, district courts are not barred per se from
considering Native American sentencing disparity at sentencing.
B. Crafting Reasonable Sentences That Take Account
of Native American Sentencing Disparity
Given that it is within a sentencing court's discretion to consider
Native American sentencing disparity, for the reasons just discussed, the
remaining issue is how district courts are to consider this disparity in
crafting a reasonable sentence. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court
in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough helped clarify district and appellate courts'
roles and responsibilities in sentencing, with Kimbrough's discussion
being most directly applicable to the issue of sentencing Native
American defendants. By following these guideposts from the Supreme
Court and noting some of the factors considered by the Sixth Circuit in
the fast-track context, district courts can award reasonable sentences
that account for Native American sentencing disparity.
The first step for any district court is to calculate the applicable
Guidelines range.46 After this, the district court is then to consider the
relevant § 3553(a) factors in the case. 69 Under this approach, concern
regarding Native American sentencing disparity is but one of many
factors district court judges are to consider at sentencing,47 ° with
§ 3553(a)(1), for example, instructing district courts to consider "the
468. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575; Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007)
(citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
469. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575; Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97.
470. District courts' charge to consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors also played a part in
United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, where the Sixth Circuit emphasized that it was reasonable for
the lower court departure not to fully eliminate the fast-track disparity because the court
considered other factors in its departure, such as the "aberrational nature" of the defendant's
prior crime in comparison to his conduct since reentering the United States. 453 F.3d 371,
373, 375 (6th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, many courts have relied on the fact that the need to
avoid sentencing disparities is only one of the relevant factors under § 3553(a) as the basis for
holding that a within-Guidelines sentence is not unreasonable solely due to the existence of
fast-track disparity. In another Sixth Circuit case, for example, the court stated:
The district court balanced the need to avoid sentencing disparities with
those sentences in fast-track districts with the need, in this case, to protect
the public and impress upon defendant and others the importance of
obeying the laws of the United States. In so balancing the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, the court appropriately addressed defendant's
sentencing disparity concerns.
United States v. Hernandez-Fierros, 453 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Part V.2.b.
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nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant. 4 7' The issue of Native American
sentencing disparity, however, can be directly addressed in § 3553(a)(6),
and furthermore, § 3553(a)(5) instructs the court to consider Sentencing
Commission reports, under which it may be permissible to reference the
report by the Native American Advisory Group.7
Importantly, the Court in Kimbrough emphasized that a finding that
unwarranted sentencing disparity exists with respect to the 100:1 crack-
powder ratio did not give a district court the authority to make a policy
determination as to what an appropriate ratio would be.473 Thus, courts
seem to be similarly barred from crafting a per se rule as to how federal-
state disparity for Native American defendants should be resolved.
Instead, the final sentence, bearing in mind the unwarranted sentencing
disparity, is to be framed in accord with § 3553(a)'s general charge that
"[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)]. ' '74
In determining a defendant's sentence, § 3553(a)(2) requires a
district court judge to consider:
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.
71
A court seeking to reduce the disparity between federal and state
471. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
472. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575 (discussing how the district court "alluded to the
Sentencing Commission's reports criticizing the [100:1] ratio, noting that the Commission
,recognizes that crack cocaine has not caused the damage that the Justice Department alleges
it has"') (citations omitted).
473. See id.
474. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
475. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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sentences may therefore frame its discussion in terms of the state
sentence's ability to adequately meet the requirements of § 3553(a)(2).
Additionally, a lower court can also use § 3553(a)(2) to show that a
within-Guidelines sentence fails to adequately consider the impact a
particular offense has within the local Native American community.
This focus on the factors in § 3553(a)(2) raises an important question
as to how much a district court judge's focus on issues such as promoting
respect for the law, providing deterrence, and the like can be assessed in
terms of the crime and the sentence's impact on the local Native
American community, rather than the United States at large. The
Second Circuit has addressed this issue directly, in light of sentences by
Judge Sifton, a senior judge in the Eastern District of New York, who
has written two opinions reflecting that this consideration of a crime's
impact on the local community can justify a non-Guidelines sentence,
even when a concern about unwarranted sentencing disparities is not at
issue in a particular case. 76 In these cases, which concerned gun crimes
in New York City, Judge Sifton agreed that "subjective considerations
such as 'local mores' or feelings about a particular type of crime may not
be an appropriate basis for granting a Guidelines departure or a non-
Guidelines sentence," but he argued that it was appropriate, post-
Booker, for courts to consider whether "the crime will have a greater or
lesser impact given the locality of its commission" in sentencing a
defendant.477 He contended that this was distinct from accounting for
unwarranted sentencing disparity under § 3553(a)(6) . In these cases,
Judge Sifton concluded that he could consider departing upward to
apply a harsher sentence, similar to that which existed for New York
state defendants, not to correct for federal-state sentencing disparity,
but rather based upon objective facts that gun trafficking has a more
serious impact on New York City than is reflected under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.79
The Second Circuit rejected Judge Sifton's analysis, holding "that
the district court erred in its analysis under factor (a)(2) by sentencing
[the defendant] on the basis of a policy judgment concerning the gravity
of firearms smuggling into a heavily populated area, like New York
City, rather than on circumstances particular to the individual defendant
476. United States v. Paul, CR-05-383 (CPS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *11-13
(E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2006); United States v. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-96 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
477. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
478. See id.
479. Paul, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *16 n.4.
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and his crime. '"4 0 Despite this rebuke of Judge Sifton's methodology,
the Second Circuit stated that "[wie do not decide that consideration by
a sentencing court of population density or similar community-based
factors is impermissible in all cases," but noted that "the circumstances
under which a district court can base a sentence on such factors in a
manner that is both compatible with the § 3553(a) factors and in keeping
with its judicial role will arise infrequently." ''
Based on the Second Circuit's discussion of this issue, district courts
will need to strike a careful balance between discussing the unique
impact particular crimes and sentences have on Indian country, while at
the same time, ensuring that such a discussion continues to focus on the
particular defendant in that case, which is the area of the court's
expertise. It is worth noting that the Eighth Circuit has already
implicitly approved of this sentencing technique in the Native American
context post-Booker. In United States v. Plumman,2 the Eighth Circuit
affirmed Judge Kornmanns 483 resentencing of a Native American
defendant in the wake of Booker to 384 months imprisonment and five
years supervised release for sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse of
two minor females.4 84 At resentencing, the Government asked the judge
to reimpose a life sentence in accord with the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, while the defendant asked for 180 months imprisonment.'
Judge Kornmann, although noting that "there was no basis for a
traditional downward departure.... granted a variance to 384 months[]
imprisonment, noting several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors., 486
Unfortunately, this sentencing transcript is unavailable, but the
appellate court noted that, at sentencing, Judge Kornmann "commented
about the level of violence and risks to Native American women and
children on South Dakota reservations. 4 87 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
480. United States v. Cavera, 505 F.3d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
481. Id. at 224.
482. 188 F. App'x 529 (8th Cir. 2006).
483. Judge Kornmann has been an outspoken critic of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' impact on Native Americans. See Kornmann, supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
484. Judge Kornmann originally sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment on some
counts and 180 months on others. Plumman, 188 F. App'x at 529. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the convictions and the 180-month sentences, but vacated and remanded the life
sentences due to Booker. Id. On remand, Judge Kornmann sentenced Plumman to 384
months imprisonment and five years supervised release, to be served concurrently. Id.
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the sentence as reasonable, noting that the record indicated that the
sentencing judge had considered the § 3553(a) factors, and furthermore,
disagreeing with the defendant's contention that "the court's expression
of concern about the violence on Indian reservations in South Dakota
shows the court gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
factor."4
The Eighth Circuit's approval of the impact of crime on a
reservation being a relevant sentencing factor mirrors, to some degree,
Judge Sifton's discussion of the use of § 3553(a)(2), and is distinct from
489the Eighth Circuit's departure ground in Big Crow and its progeny.
Plumman, however, underscores a tension between concern regarding
Native American sentencing disparity and consideration of a crime's
impact on the local Native American community-that because crime
often has a greater impact on Native American reservations than the
United States at large, § 3553(a)(2) may often cut in favor of an upward,
rather than a downward, variance from the Guidelines.49 In light of this
fact, Plumman is interesting in that the judge expressed concern about
the high level of violence on South Dakota reservations, but the
491
ultimate sentence was below the Guidelines' range.
In general, consideration of § 3553(a)(2) with respect to a particular
Native American defendant in Indian country will most strongly favor a
downward variance for that defendant when the underlying crime's
effect on Indian country is less than that for the rest of the nation. For
example, federal penalties for possessing child pornography, which were
greatly enhanced under the PROTECT Act, could be lessened for
Native American defendants because this is not a highly prosecuted
crime in Indian country.49 Furthermore, factors mitigating in favor of an
upward variance may be offset to some degree by § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s
requirement that the sentence "promote respect for the law,,
493
something that, according to the Native American Advisory Group, has
been inhibited by disproportionately harsh federal sentences.494
Moreover, § 3553(a)(2) may also be important independent of
§ 3553(a)(6)'s requirement to avoid "unwarranted sentencing
disparities" in circuits that may reject the notion that federal-state
488. Id.
489. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
490. Plumman, 188 F. App'x at 529-30.
491. See id.
492. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 1, at 24 n.42.
493. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
494. Id. at 10-11.
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sentencing disparity, even in the Native American context, is
unwarranted. Although the tension between § 3553(a)(2) and
§ 3553(a)(6) is largely what caused the Second Circuit to vacate the
sentence in Cavera,4 95 Plumman itself is an example of the ability to use
§ 3553(a)(2) to run around § 3553(a)(6),"6 since the Eighth Circuit,
which has a high number of Native American cases, has thus far placed a
bar on considering federal-state disparity under § 3553(a)(6) post-
Booker.7
While an emphasis on the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2) may
seemingly, in some circumstances, call for an upward, rather than
downward variance from the Guidelines, in light of Gall, it is clear that
this determination is one for the district court to make. Gall held that
regardless of the sentence imposed, appellate courts are to review the
sentence under an abuse of discretion standard, "giv[ing] due deference
to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,
justify the extent of the variance., 498 Despite the uniform application of
the abuse of discretion standard, however, the Court also determined
"that a major departure should be supported by a more significant
justification than a minor one., 4' 99 Therefore, arguments to eliminate
Native American sentencing disparity will be most compelling when a
consideration of § 3553(a)(2) also indicates that a particular crime is not
an overly serious concern in Indian country. Likewise, in circumstances
where a crime particularly plagues Native American communities, a
minimal reduction in the sentence from that recommended in the
Guidelines, in order to account for Native American sentencing
disparity, will be more likely to withstand appellate scrutiny. By
following the guideposts discussed in this section, district courts should
be able to craft reasonable sentences that help correct, even if they do
not fully reduce, Native American sentencing disparity.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of Indian tribes' unique status as "domestic dependent
nations," crime in Indian country is governed by a complex intersection
495. United States v. Cavera, 505 F.3d 216, 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2007).
496. Plumman, 188 F. App'x at 530.
497. See United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Unwarranted
sentencing disparities among federal defendants remains the only consideration under
§ 3553(a)(6)-both before and after Booker.").
498. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
499. Id.
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of federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction, with the end result that Native
American defendants committing crimes in Indian country are
prosecuted under federal, rather than state, law. One unintended
consequence of this jurisdictional arrangement is that Native Americans
are subjected to disproportionately harsher sentences because federal
offenses typically carry stiffer penalties than corresponding state
sentences. This sentencing disparity was only exacerbated by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which greatly restricted judicial
discretion to correct for this disparity.
A wide range of solutions have been offered to address the unique
issues surrounding the sentencing of Native American defendants under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Systemically reducing the level of
sentencing disparity for Native Americans would require either
substantial revision to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or
modification of the Major Crimes Act. Unfortunately, the Sentencing
Commission's recent attempt to modify the Guidelines in response to
concerns from the Native American community only marginally reduced
the sentencing disparity for Native American defendants. Similarly,
there does not appear to be any indication that Congress will amend the
Major Crimes Act to eradicate this disparity anytime in the near future.
While those avenues for eliminating Native American sentencing
disparity appear closed, judges are able to correct for this disparity on a
case-by-case basis, and because this disparity is the product of a
jurisdictional quirk, the judiciary is the branch of government best
suited to addressing this issue.
Just a few years ago, the likelihood of an appellate court upholding a
downward departure to account for Native American sentencing
disparity as reasonable would have been marginal at best. However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Booker that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory, breathed new life into
the potential viability of this argument. Although post-Booker statistics
show that judges are not reducing their sentences for Native American
defendants, the post-Booker debate surrounding fast-track sentencing
disparity and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kimbrough
regarding deviation from the 100:1 crack-powder ratio provide a
measuring stick by which to gauge the probable success of downward
variances based on Native American sentencing disparity being upheld
as reasonable.
Downward variances to account for fast-track and crack-powder
disparities had largely been met with resistance by the circuit courts,
although in the fast-track context, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ossa-
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Gallegos showed that such disparity could be a valid consideration at
sentencing. While Ossa-Gallegos left a glimmer of hope that similar
non-Guidelines sentences in the Native American context could
similarly withstand appellate scrutiny, the Supreme Court's December
2007 decision in Kimbrough regarding the crack-powder disparity
provides even greater promise that sentences accounting for Native
American sentencing disparity will be upheld as reasonable. The same
reasons offered in Kimbrough as to why it is not per se unreasonable to
consider the crack-powder disparity are similarly applicable in the
Native American context-Congress has not barred courts from using
its discretion to sentence within the statutory mandatory minimums and
maximums, and the Sentencing Commission has expressed concern
regarding the Guidelines' treatment of both the crack-powder ratio and
the sentencing of Native American defendants.
There is, however, one important characteristic of Native American
sentencing disparity that is distinct from that in the fast-track or crack-
powder context. This is that, for Native Americans, the disparity is
between federal and state sentences, a consideration that has generally
been held not to fall within the ambit of § 3553(a)(6)'s requirement that
courts consider "unwarranted sentencing disparities." This general
refusal by courts to consider such disparity, however, should be
inapplicable in the Native American context, given Native Americans'
''unique legal status . . . under federal law," the Sentencing
Commission's admitted concern about such disparity, the fact that
consideration of federal-state disparity in this context does not impinge
upon prosecutorial discretion, and the courts' position as the body of
government best suited to addressing this disparity.
In terms of how district courts are then to sentence Native
Americans, the Supreme Court has made clear that courts are to
consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors for that particular case, paying
specific attention to the need for sentences to be no greater than
necessary to achieve the goals in § 3553(a)(2). Some tension exists
however, as to how much this focus on § 3553(a)(2) can stray from a
consideration of the particular defendant to a broader consideration of a
sentence's impact on the local Native American community, and
moreover, whether in some circumstances, such a consideration would
cut in favor of awarding an upward, rather than a downward variance
from the Guidelines. While these tensions will need to be ironed out by
the district and circuit courts, Kimbrough at least ensures that such
issues are worthy of discussion in the Native American context. This is
what makes this Article's proposal for correcting for Native American
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sentencing disparity so compelling. While this proposal is not the most
far-reaching solution that has been offered for correcting this disparity,
it is the most realistic because it draws upon recent attempts by the
Supreme Court and circuit courts to define the contours of federal
judges' sentencing discretion in the aftermath of Booker. It also carries
the additional benefits of recognizing that the courts are, in many
respects, the proper body for resolving this issue, providing an
immediate solution to the problem, and avoiding the judicial game-
playing with the Guidelines that is readily apparent in decisions such as
Big Crow.
* * *
